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Currently, the US seems to be solely focused on achieving success in the 
liberation of Iraq and the establishment of a working democracy there.  What has 
been often overlooked is the historical legacy of a tiny nation in the Levant, 
Lebanon. Many studies show Lebanon as a viable democracy prior to the start of 
the civil war in 1975. Today, the infrastructure and the institutions for successfully 
transitioning back to democracy are still present and are already further enforced.  
Among the Arab states, Lebanon is the most likely to succeed in transitioning to 
democracy.  Considering US national security strategy of propagating democracy 
and free enterprise, it would be vital to US national security interests to consider 
Lebanon.  Successfully supporting a return to democracy there would not only 
lessen its appeal as a haven for terrorism, but would also provide the US with a 
democratic Arab ally in the Middle East.  
This case study identifies path dependence as a significant factor behind 
the US policy of disengagement toward Lebanon since 1983.  It argues that 
instead of the vicious cycle of disengagement wrought by the 1980s policy, a 

































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii




I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
A. US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND LEBANON .................. 1 
B. US POLICY TOWARD LEBANON ...................................................... 2 
C. PATH DEPENDENCE.......................................................................... 3 
D. PATH DEPENDENCE AND POLICY MAKING THEORIES ................ 4 
E. PATH DEPENDENCE AND US POLICY TOWARD LEBANON ......... 8 
II. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LEBANON FROM 1975 
TO 1983 ........................................................................................................ 11 
A. INTRODUCTION................................................................................ 11 
B. HISTORICAL AND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF LEBANON...... 12 
C. THE FORD ADMINISTRATION ......................................................... 14 
D. THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION .................................................... 19 
E. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION.................................................... 20 
F. ASSESSING US POLICY TOWARD LEBANON FROM 1975 TO 
1983 ................................................................................................... 24 
III. CRITICAL JUNCTURE AND PATH DEPENDENCE: US FOREIGN 
POLICY FROM 1983 TO PRESENT ............................................................ 27 
A. INTRODUCTION................................................................................ 27 
B. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (1983 – 1988)............................. 28 
C. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989 – 1992).................................. 32 
D. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION (1993 – 2000) ............................ 35 
E. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2001 – PRESENT) ......................... 37 
F. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEBANON................................................. 40 
IV. THE BEGINNING AND THE ONGOING TRANSFORMATION OF 
LEBANON’S “HEZBOLLAH,” THE PARTY OF GOD ................................. 45 
A. INTRODUCTION................................................................................ 45 
B. FROM QUIETISM TO RADICALISM ................................................. 46 
C. IRANIAN INFLUENCE AND SHEIKH FADLALLAH ......................... 48 
D. THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR ............................................................ 50 
E. FROM RADICALISM TO POLITICAL ISLAMISM ............................. 54 
F. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 56 
V. THE SYRIA ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY 
RESTORATION ACT OF 2003..................................................................... 59 
A. INTRODUCTION................................................................................ 59 
B. THE SALSRA AND LEBANON ......................................................... 60 
C. IMPLICATIONS TO US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES ....... 64 
D. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SALSRA AND LEBANON .................. 67 
VI. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 71 
A. PATH DEPENDENCE THEORY........................................................ 71 
 viii
B. WHERE DOES THE US GO FROM HERE?...................................... 72 
C. LEBANON’S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY ................................. 73 
D. IRAQ, LEBANON, AND THE US NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY........................................................................................ 77 
LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 81 













 I am forever grateful … 
… to my beloved wife Isabel, my teenage daughter Ruth and my 
kindergartner son Adrian for their love, support and patience 
throughout this NPS tour.  
… to my professor and thesis advisor Dr. Anne Marie Baylouny for 
her trust, confidence, encouragements, insights and advice. 
… to my professor and 2nd reader, Professor James Russell and to 
all my professors at NPS – Dr. Barak Salmoni, Dr. Vali Nasr, Dr. 
Edwin Micewski, Dr. Letitia Lawson, Dr. Maria Morgan, Dr. Robert 
Looney, Dr. John Leslie, Dr. Solomon Major, Dr. Boris Keyser, and 
Dr. Daniel Moran – in a lot of ways they are a part of this thesis and 
a valuable part of my NPS experience.  
… to my fellow students and colleagues for the vibrant exchange of 
ideas and to the NPS staff – Dora Martinez, Mario Salim, Lina 
Ventura, Jennifer West (and the rest of the library staff), and Pam 
Silva – for taking care of my administrative needs and making 































A. US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND LEBANON 
Currently, the United States (US) seems to be solely focused on achieving 
success in the liberation of Iraq and the establishment of a working democracy 
there.  What has been often overlooked is the historical legacy of a tiny nation in 
the Levant, Lebanon. Many studies show Lebanon as a viable democracy prior to 
the start of the civil war in 1975. Today, the infrastructure and the institutions for 
successfully transitioning back to democracy are still present and are already 
further enforced.  Among the Arab states, Lebanon is the most likely to succeed 
in transitioning to democracy.  Considering US national security strategy of 
propagating democracy to every corner of the world, it would be in the best 
interest of the US to consider Lebanon.  Successfully supporting a return to 
democracy there would not only lessen its appeal as a haven for terrorism, but 
would also provide the US with a democratic Arab ally in the Middle East.  
The US national security strategy centers on establishing regimes friendly 
to the West, arguably through liberal democracy and free enterprise in the Middle 
East. A viable US policy that could assist Lebanon in establishing a democracy 
and free market would aid the US in accomplishing its national security strategies 
in the Middle East.  
Aside from bringing Lebanon back to the forefront of US foreign policies, 
due to a belief that democracy there is feasible with some help, this paper also 
addresses academic theory.  I contribute to academic theory construction and 
research by testing “path dependence” theory and viewing its application in 
foreign policy making. Although much has been written on path dependence 
theory as it applies to business and economics, it remains in the infantile stages 
in the social and political sciences. This paper will hopefully advance path 
dependence theory and apply it in a political science setting. It is important for 
foreign policy makers to be aware of events that could trigger dependent paths, 
to recognize them, and to consciously factor their effects in decision making.  
2 
Failure to do so could negatively affect future policies because alternatives 
outside the path dependent policy would not be considered. 
 
B. US POLICY TOWARD LEBANON 
United States policy toward Lebanon prior to the Beirut bombings in 1983 
appeared to be characterized by cooperation, mutual trade, and the promotion of 
democracy and free enterprise. This policy was centered on the strategic 
importance of Lebanon. But after the terrorist bombings that killed over 300 US 
servicemen and other multinational force peacekeepers, the US pulled out, 
changing its policies and completely ignoring Lebanon.  This arguably 
contributed to the Lebanese state’s demise in the 1980’s and the prolonged civil 
war. The war ended with Syria entering Lebanon militarily and exercising 
hegemony over political leaders, allowing preferred violent groups such as 
Hezbollah to continue in existence or flourish. 
Since the 1983 bombings, US-Lebanese relations have been cold. For the 
most part, Lebanon has been “lumped in” with Syria as far as foreign policy 
making is concerned. This may be a mistake. Prior to the civil war, Lebanon had 
a history of peace and democracy unparalleled in the Middle East. It was where 
East met West, and was a center of liberal ideas and open exchange of 
knowledge, trade, and commerce. At one point, it was even touted as the 
“Switzerland” of the Middle East. For many reasons, geography and democracy 
among them, Lebanon has historically been of strategic importance to the US. 
Thus it is important to understand what happened at that time and what is 
happening now in Lebanon in the context of foreign policy making. Why was 
Lebanon historically and strategically important to US national security 
strategies?  How did that importance translate into policies?  What drove US 
policies before the bombings? What influenced those policies after the 
bombings? Did one particular incident irrevocably influence subsequent policies?  
Is it still influencing policy making today?  Finally, what could US policy makers 
do to improve relations with Lebanon, assuming it is in the US’s best interests to 
do so?  This paper explores possible answers to those questions.  
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C. PATH DEPENDENCE 
Path dependence is a theory that emerged from the field of economics.  
The theory implies that when markets make remediable errors in the choice of 
products, in the development of products, or any other aspect of an economic 
decision, they seem unwilling to change such initial choice even when better 
choices come along. Neither do markets remedy the error when it can be 
overcome.   Markets seem to be locked-in to a particular path, and all their other 
choices become dependent on the initial choice.1  The point in time or the event 
when that initial choice or decision was made is commonly called a “critical 
juncture.” The decision made during this critical juncture can have important 
influences, sometimes irreversible ones, on future decisions. These future 
decisions then are said to be path dependent on the initial decision.  
The decisions made during a critical juncture may be a conscious decision 
or could be arbitrary.  The effects would be the same.  A commonly cited 
example in the business world is the dominance of the VHS format over Beta in 
the video cassette recorder business.2 The decision by early adopters to 
embrace the VHS format led to future adopters and inventors to follow and 
market the same VHS format.  Beta may have been the superior format but the 
market could not go back when the choice was made at that critical juncture.   
The best known example of a case of path dependence is the 
configuration of the typewriter (or computer) keyboard.  The standard “QWERTY” 
keyboard arrangement was proven to be dramatically inferior to an arrangement 
made by August Dvorak and yet we have been and are still using the standard 
“QWERTY” keyboard arrangement. We do not use the Drovak arrangement 
keyboard because they are hard to find; and they are hard to find because no 
one wanted to make and use them.3  We have been so used to the QWERTY 
keyboard arrangement that efficiency did not matter.  We, as well as computer 
                                            
1 Stan Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, “Policy and Path Dependence: From QWERTY to 
Windows 95,” Regulation, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1995). 




makers, were locked in to a dependent path created by that initial choice to use 
the QWERTY arrangement.    
There are limited cases outside economics where path dependence has 
been studied. In comparative politics, Mahoney explains how choices made by 
Central American countries at critical junctures during the nineteenth-century 
liberal reform period established the direction for the Central American countries 
development. Mahoney shows why Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua developed into different types of political regimes, 
based on decisions these countries made at crucial times in their history. Their 
choices regarding state and agrarian development during early in the nineteenth 
century established the development of three types of political regimes in the 
twentieth century – military-authoritarian (Guatemala, El Salvador), liberal 
democratic (Costa Rica), and traditional dictatorial (Honduras, Nicaragua).4 
Likewise, Hedlund argues Russia failed to satisfactorily transition to 
democracy, market economy, and rule of law because “Russian reformers failed 
to take into account a deeply rooted Russian path dependence.”5 He contends 
Russia is stuck “in an institutional position that is characterized by market-
suppressing, rule-evasive and anti-democratic features;” and that “by focusing 
narrowly on changes in the formal rules of the game, they neglected pressing 
needs for broader institutional change, including a credible commitment by the 
Russian government to impartially enforcing a rules-based system.”6  
 
D. PATH DEPENDENCE AND POLICY MAKING THEORIES 
Applying path dependence theory to the process of US foreign policy 
making toward Lebanon is not a simple task.  There are many different theories 
and perspectives that could explain US foreign policy.  Each has its own merit. It 
becomes necessary then to analyze some of the most common theories in                                             
4 James Mahoney, The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in 
Central America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). 
5 Stefan Hedlund, “Path Dependence in Russian Policy Making: Constraints on Putin’s 
Economic Choice,” Post-Communist Economies, Vol 12, No. 4 (2000). 389, 403. 
6 Ibid. 
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academic literature that were considered in this paper and briefly discuss them in 
relation to path dependence theory.  
To perform an analysis of US foreign policy, it would be important first to 
understand the theoretical framework of foreign policy making. William Quandt 
identifies three models of foreign policy decision-making: rational, step-by-step 
analysis of objectives (strategic model); a “shoot from the hip” or politics-driven 
type decision-making (bureaucratic politics model); and domestic politics-driven 
policymaking model. Quandt then proceeded to argue that crises play an 
extremely important role, implying an event-driven policymaking model.7  
Event-driven policy making seems to be closely related to path 
dependence. However, it is similar but not the same. Quandt’s event-driven 
model suggests a policy change only happens after a particular event, as a 
reaction to a crisis. On the other hand, path dependence theory points to one 
particular event or decision that influences, sometimes in an irreversible or 
uncontrollable manner, subsequent policies.8 
The rational approach assumes rational decision makers make foreign 
policy decisions. It implies careful deliberation of national interests and rational 
policy processes exist. That may not always be the case. Jervis argues 
irrationality often enters in policy making. He contends that perceptions and 
misperceptions regarding circumstances, actions, and inactions by other actors 
influence and shape policy choices and decisions.9 Path dependence theorists 
would most likely agree with Jervis.  
Many also have argued different perspectives, values, and personalities of 
different leaders within an administration influences policy making. Among many 
explanations, George looks at the policymaker as a consistency seeker, 
assimilating information to make it coincide with his perceptions and existing 
                                            
7 William Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 
1967, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 6-10. 
8 Stan Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, “Policy and Path Dependence: From QWERTY to 
Windows 95,” Regulation, Vol 18, No. 3 (1995). 
9 Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on misperception,” World Politics, Vol. 20 No. 3 (1968): 456. 
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beliefs. George even looks at the psychological factors that influence decision-
making.10 
Bureaucratic politics too can be influential in policy making. Many, 
especially in the early 1960’s and 70’s, wrote about the importance of how policy 
decisions are made and how that process influences the decisional outcomes. 
Many applied this paradigm to foreign policy making. Others dissented. Art 
argues that the bureaucratic politics paradigm is not the central theme in the 
formulation and implementation of American foreign policy; and that it has been 
given more merit than necessary. Art contends that the president’s decisions, his 
intents and perspectives, hold greater influence.11  
Foreign policy making may also be driven by domestic policies. In the 
case of Lebanon, the gruesome images broadcasted on national television may 
have contributed significantly to galvanizing public opinion against continued 
engagement in Lebanon. In a democracy, presidents have to take action in 
accordance with the people they represent or suffer consequences at the ballot 
box. Fearon states that leaders during a crisis have three choices: to attack, to 
back down, or to further escalate the situation.12 The leader would have to 
choose one that his “audience” (domestic constituents) probably wants. 
President Ronald Reagan backed down.  
There are also historical explanations. So much so that Neustadt and May 
put forward a specific process to help in overcoming the temptation to incorrectly 
use history.  They did however provide many examples in the use of history as a 
guide to decision making.13  
                                            
10 Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of 
Information and Advice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), Chapters 2, 3. 
11 Robert Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique,” Policy 
Sciences, Vol. 4 (1973). 
12 James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International 
Disputes,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (1994): 577-592. 
13 Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for 
Decision Makers, (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1986), Ch. 7. 
7 
Historical explanations can also be derived from specific historical analysis 
of the Middle East. Fromkin traces how and why the modern Middle East was 
created from decisions made by the Allies during and after the First World War.14 
It provides possible underlying reasons for the problems the US encounters 
today.  
Picard provides an account of the realities of Lebanon since its creation 
after the First World War. She gives a compelling account of “the specific 
historical, ecological, and cultural conditions of the country and its differences 
from and also its resemblances to its neighbors” taking into account “the heavy 
heritage of the colonial period….”15 Schiff and Ya’ari provide a history and 
analysis of the Israeli War in Lebanon — relevant in US policy making toward 
Lebanon.16 Many other authors, including David McDowall and Tabitha Petran, 
provide rationales for understanding Lebanese and Middle East history and 
politics, and their relations to US foreign policies.  
There is no doubt that realist, liberal, and other theories of international 
relations and policy have much to say on this issue. Familiar realist arguments of 
anarchy, balance of power, and security will surface. It is easy to see Reagan’s 
“cut and run” policy after the 1983 bombings as simply intended to cut US losses 
regarding an unachievable objective. According to this perspective, subsequent 
policies were then promulgated based on security considerations and not biased 
by the bombings. Liberal arguments supporting an explanation that the US was 
merely compromising with the United Nations and the international community 
may also arise.     
There are a myriad of possible explanations that could compete with path 
dependence   theory.   In addition, there are many more factors to consider, 
including culture and religion that could possibly explain US policy toward 
                                            
14 David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Creation of the Modern Middle East, (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 1989). 
15 Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered Country, (New York, NY: Holmes and Meier, 
2002), ix. 
16 Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War. (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 
1984). 
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Lebanon after the 1983 bombings.  I consider these various factors and variables 
in this paper.   
 
E. PATH DEPENDENCE AND US POLICY TOWARD LEBANON 
Using the methodology of process tracing in order to test theory, this 
paper investigates the historical record of the change in US policy toward 
Lebanon after the 1983 Beirut bombings. I seek to determine whether US 
strategic interests changed or some other cause was responsible for altering US 
policy toward Lebanon. I find that the historical and strategic importance of 
Lebanon to US national interests did not change after the 1983 Beirut bombings.  
As such, the significant differences in policy before and after the bombings were 
not warranted. United States policy should not have drastically changed. I 
conclude that US interests would have been better served by continuing 
engagement even after the 1983 Beirut bombings.   
Reagan’s decision to pull US military personnel from Beirut, a policy that 
came to be known as “cut and run policy,” heavily influenced subsequent US 
policies toward Lebanon. The president’s decision triggered a dependent path, 
limiting subsequent decision makers’ policy choices, and negatively affecting 
subsequent US policies.  While other factors could have contributed to the 
decision making process, it was clear that the influence of path dependence was 
significant.  The Beirut bombings and the subsequent “cut and run” policy were 
mentioned and considered in every major policy discussion.  Path dependence 
theory is a factor that explains US policy toward Lebanon for the last two 
decades.  An analysis of US policy toward Lebanon from 1975 to 1983 (Chapters 
II) and 1984 to 2004 (Chapter III) supports that finding. 
The strategic interests behind US support toward Lebanon before the 
1983 Beirut bombings still exist today.  These interests are even more pressing 
in the context of the US national security strategy of promoting liberal democracy 
and free enterprise worldwide currently. The crucial question explored in this 
paper is “Does current US policy effectively serves US strategic goals?”   
9 
Considering the goal of building democratic states, the answer to the 
above question is: “it could be better.”  The US still fails to recognize the path 
dependence brought about by Reagan’s decision.  Lebanon was once the only 
democratic Arab state in the Middle East.  It could once again occupy that 
distinction.  Lebanon still has the infrastructure and the institutions necessary to 
transition back to democracy. The US needs to recognize that opportunity, break 
away from its path dependency, and search for a new policy consistent with its 
national security strategies. 
There are two issues presented in this paper that US policy makers can 
begin evaluating: Hezbollah, and the Syria Accountability and Lebanese 
Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003.  These are the same issues the Lebanese 
Ambassador to the United States, His Excellency Farid Abboud, considers to be 
the most controversial issues affecting US-Lebanese relations.17 The US still 
considers Hezbollah a terrorist organization; and the US has enacted legislation 
mandating the US executive branch to take action to stop Syria’s hegemony over 




















                                            
17 Mr. Abboud often talks about these two issues in many interviews, most recently in a guest 












































II. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LEBANON 
FROM 1975 TO 1983 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I trace the historical background of United States-
Lebanese relationship, and focus on the historical and strategic importance of 
Lebanon and the ensuing United States (US) foreign policy prior to the 1983 
Beirut bombings. My analysis of US foreign policy for this chapter will start from 
the beginning of the second Lebanese Civil War in 1975, to 1983, the year when 
over 300 US and French peacekeepers were killed in suicide bomber attacks. I 
analyze US national security strategies and the ensuing foreign policy goals of 
the administrations of US Presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald 
Reagan as they apply toward Lebanon. We will also discuss the effects of the 
international political environment and the impacts of other international players 
in US policy making toward Lebanon.   
It is important to understand the historical and strategic importance of 
Lebanon to US national security strategies before the 1983 bombings. Lebanon’s 
importance to the US is a factor determining how future policies toward the 
country, and more generally, toward the Middle East, were affected when that 
policy shifted in early 1984.  If the historical and strategic importance of Lebanon 
was the same prior to 1983 and after 1983, why then did US policies change?  I 
argue that the 1983 bombings constituted a critical juncture and created a 
dependent path policy makers were forced to tread and continue to tread.  I 
explore this hypothesis in the next chapter. In this chapter I establish Lebanon’s 
importance to US national security strategies, and how that was demonstrated in 
the conduct of US foreign policy.  I start with President Ford’s administration and 
the realist influence of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. I then proceed to 
President Carter’s drive for a comprehensive Middle East peace and limited 
success at the Camp David Accords. I end with a discussion of the idealist 
tendencies and fear of Soviet expansion which characterized the early part of 
President Reagan’s administration.   
12 
B. HISTORICAL AND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF LEBANON 
Using research data from Freedom House that calculated a country’s 
“freedom rating,” Eva Bellin found that in 2002, there were only two out of twenty-
one countries in the Middle East and North Africa that qualify as electoral 
democracies. That was down from three in 1972. Electoral democracy was 
defined as a “regime that chooses its government through regular, free, 
competitive election.”18 The two that qualified in 2002 are Turkey and Israel. In 
1972, there was another democratic country in that list: Lebanon.     
Thus it should not come as a surprise that the US would support the 
Lebanese government simply on the basis of the idea of democracy.  Lebanon 
had been historically democratic.  Its people, despite of, and arguably because of 
the variety of ethnic and religious identities, had been living together in peace for 
scores of years.  Even when they were under the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon was 
ruling itself.  Engin Akarli stated that it was during this interlude of internal peace 
under the Ottoman Empire (roughly from the civil war of 1860 to the beginning of 
the French Mandate in 1920) that the Lebanese learned to effect sociopolitical 
changes via nonviolent means of conflict resolution – negotiations, arbitration, 
balance of power politics, shifting alliances. Akarli argued the indigenous 
Lebanese experience in self rule and reconciliation among different religious 
groups was the reason for peace and secular democracy (modernization in 
government) that set Lebanon apart from its Middle East neighbors after 
independence, and not Western (French) initiative.19   
Akarli’s observation implied Lebanese democratic ideas were inherent in 
Lebanon and not caused by Western influence. Therefore, democracy could 
flourish if the conditions for democracy could be properly cultivated.  This has 
enormous implications for a US foreign policy that consistently aims to propagate 
democracy throughout the globe.  President George W. Bush stated: “Finally, the 
                                            
18 Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in 
Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics (January 2004): 152. 
19 Engin Akarli further argues that it was French intervention in Lebanese politics that 
actually hampered efforts for a secular Lebanese nationality.  More of Akarli’s arguments are in 
the book The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920.   
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United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of 
freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, 
development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.”20 
Lebanon historically patterned its economic and cultural systems on 
Western principles. Lebanon had historical ties with the West as France’s 
protectorate from the end of World War I, during its rise as a merchant nation, 
and up until the beginning of its civil war in 1975.  During this time, Lebanon, and 
specifically its capital Beirut, was an example of a liberal democracy in an Arab 
setting. The British Broadcasting Corporation reported that Lebanon then was 
regarded as a haven of liberalism and a hub for economic, social, intellectual, 
and cultural life in the Middle East.  Uncensored daily and weekly newspapers 
and journals were the norm.  This facilitated open exchange of ideas and 
provided various editorial opinions. Its open seaports and airport also facilitated 
free trade, especially between the Arab world and Europe and the rest of the 
Western world. Beirut became a banking center for the wealthy Arabs with its 
free economic and foreign exchange system, strict banking secrecy law, and 
favorable interest rates.  The free flow of capital led to investments in industry — 
textiles, shoes, printing and food processing. Many dubbed Lebanon as the next 
Switzerland and Beirut as the Paris of the Middle East.  Lebanon was the sole 
example of a liberal democracy amidst the authoritarian regimes around it, 
making it strategically important to the US.  
Militarily, Lebanon’s geographic position in the Middle East also presented 
strategic opportunities for the US.  Its seaports and airport were ideal forward 
operating bases and ports of debarkation for supplies and personnel for actions 
in the Middle East.  It was a gateway to the Arab world.  A stable, democratic, 
and West-friendly Lebanon would strengthen the US strategic position in the 
Levant and would widen US influence in the Mediterranean front (Lebanon, 
Turkey and Israel).  Such a position could have lasting effects in the global war 
on terrorism.   
                                            
20 The quote is taken from the introduction to the 2002 National Security Strategy of the US. 
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Finally, Lebanon was especially significant to the US during the Cold War 
in preventing the spread of communism and containing Soviet expansion.  It also 
became significant as an actor in bringing peace and stability to the whole region.  
Reagan stated:  “A stable and revived Lebanon is essential to all our hopes for 
peace in the region.”21 He further stated the “people of Lebanon deserve the best 
efforts of the international community to turn the nightmares of the past several 
years into a new dawn of hope.”22 The president then expressed his hopes for a 
stable and democratic Lebanon and pledged US action in achieving it.  That was 
September 1982, about a year before the bombing of the Marine barracks in 
Beirut. That bombing led to the pull out of US armed forces from Beirut, a shift in 
policy many dubbed as a “cut and run” policy.   
Because of Lebanon’s strategic importance to US interests, the US 
government had been deeply involved in ensuring the Lebanon’s political 
stability. Recall that in July 1958 the US sent Marines to help diffuse tensions 
and prevent escalation of the first Lebanese Civil War by supporting a call for 
help from Maronite President Camille Chamoun’s government. Chamoun’s 
government survived that civil war. The US, however, become particularly 
identified with the Maronites in the minds of many Lebanese. This would pose 
problems for the conduct of US policy in the 1980’s.   
From the Ford administration to the Reagan administration, the US 
consistently declared support for Lebanese sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
central government; and further worked toward peace and stability in that state 
and the whole region.  The US was committed to Lebanon because of its 
strategic importance to US national security strategies. I now discuss how that 
commitment translated into policy. 
 
C. THE FORD ADMINISTRATION 
In 1975 and 1976, during the initial years of the second Lebanese civil 
war, US President Gerald Ford and his administration were deeply involved in 
                                            
21 President Ronald Reagan’s televised speech to the nation, September 1, 1982. 
22 Ibid. 
15 
brokering and maintaining ceasefires, trying to find an acceptable solution to the 
conflict without sending US troops.  Early in the civil war, Ford sent Dean Brown 
to take charge of the US embassy in Beirut, engage all parties, and try to reach a 
moderate solution.  For the most part, the Ford administration was successful in 
extinguishing small fires and obtaining incremental results.  However, no 
comprehensive plan or approach specifically intended to end Lebanon’s 
problems ever materialized.   
President Ford’s national security team was composed of public leaders 
and policy makers still known to us today.  It included Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Director of Central 
Intelligence George Bush, and Assistant to the President and White House Chief 
of Staff Richard Cheney. In foreign policy matters, the term “Ford administration” 
mainly refers to this national security team. While committed to stabilizing the 
Lebanese government, Ford’s administration was very much aware of the 
complexities of the second civil war and realized that it was not as easy as 
sending troops to support the government. 
The Ford administration realized there were three interrelated levels which 
were at work in the early phases of the civil war: “the strictly domestic struggle to 
redistribute power, the moderate-radical struggle with the impact of outside 
powers, and the inter-Arab considerations.”23 On the first level, Lebanon’s 
confessional system and distribution of power became too problematic. The 
system was based on a 1932 census which gave the Christians a 6 to 5 ratio for 
seats in parliament, civil service positions, and the Presidency. It was widely 
perceived that the total population favored the Moslems even without including 
the Palestinians, who sought refuge in Lebanon following the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
War. As such, Moslems demanded more than the Sunni prime ministership and 
Shi’ite president of parliament positions allocated to them. They demanded 
equitable representation based on population. The first level then became the 
struggle for reallocation of power. 
                                            
23 The information presented is taken from a declassified Top Secret National Security 
Council Meeting Minutes, April 7, 1976. 
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The second level involved determining what to do with the confessional 
system, further complicated by external influences.  The conservative Christians 
and moderates within the Moslem camp wanted to preserve the status quo.  The 
radicals wanted to secularize the state and do away with the religious factions. 
The Christians were supported by Israel while the radical Moslems and Druze 
were supported by most of the Arab nations.  One would think Syria would be on 
the side of the radicals, and supporting a revolutionary secular Lebanon. At this 
point however, Syria supported the moderates in preserving the status quo. 
Since a radical Lebanon would mean more Soviet influence and a larger influx of 
arms, the end result would have been an increase in threat whereby Syria would 
be between Iran and Soviet controlled Lebanon.  Much more, Syria wanted to 
increase its influence in the Arab world by establishing itself as the leader and 
representative of the Palestinians, thousands of them now refugees in Lebanon, 
as opposed to the leadership of Yasser Arafat. Syria’s interest was for a united, 
not fragmented Lebanon capable of protecting its borders.    
While the Ford administration was counseling restraint on both Israel and 
Syria, it was not opposed to Israel sending arms to the Christians. Secretary of 
State Kissinger stated: “The Christians are getting arms from Israel which we do 
not oppose since it helps maintain the balance.”24  The “balance of power” he 
was referring to was between what the Ford Administration considered the 
radical groups (Kamal Jumblatt radicals and to some extent Yasser Arafat and 
the Palestine Liberation Organization) supported by Libya and Iraq, and the 
Lebanese Communist Party supported by the Soviet Union on the one hand,  
and the Christians on the other.  At this point too, the US was not opposed to 
Syrian intervention since it served US interests in preserving a West-leaning 
government in Lebanon.  The Ford administration however was very much aware 
of the possible long term implications – Syria could be the dominant power in the 
Levant and could pose a major radical threat. Israel shared the same concern. 
                                            
24 Ibid. 
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The third level, the dynamics of inter-Arab relations, was much more 
complex than the first two levels and posed major challenges for US policy 
makers.  Conventional assumptions on the possible positions of the various Arab 
nations toward the Lebanese civil war did not hold true.  I showed Syria’s role 
and positions at this point.  Egypt’s role would have been to support Syrian goals 
but Egypt was apparently still angry with Syria for a number of reasons, including 
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and attempts at Arab unification. Egypt seemed to 
have provided aid to the radicals.  
United States policy makers also saw Saudi Arabia playing a very 
complex role. Saudi Arabia was supporting the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) in order to restrain its excesses and control it while at the 
same time it was opposing the radicals. Saudi Arabia also wanted Syria to 
succeed politically in Lebanon and bring stability; but it did not want Syria to bring 
in its military.  Doing so would cause Israel to move in militarily also.   
Jordan expressed its support for the Syrian intervention and the 
elimination of the radicals.  In his visit to the US and meeting with Ford in 1976, 
King Hussein of Jordan reminisced about its own handling of radicals in Jordan in 
1970 and wanted Syria to finish the job.     
The most dominant and influential figure in President Ford’s national 
security team was Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Often he set the stage for 
defining overarching strategy for US policies in the Middle East.  He stated:   
My country's history, Mr. President, tells us that it is possible to 
fashion unity while cherishing diversity, that common action is 
possible despite the variety of races, interests, and beliefs we see 
here in this chamber. Progress and peace and justice are 
attainable. So we say to all peoples and governments: Let us 
fashion together a new world order.25 
Working under Kissinger’s grand strategy of establishing a new world 
order, US policy in Lebanon was integrally connected to the search for Middle 
East peace. For many observers, the Ford administration simply considered 
                                            
25 This quote is taken from Henry Kissinger’s speech before the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, October 1975. 
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Lebanon an extension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. I will not dispute such 
observations or assumptions regarding internal motivations. What was evident in 
government documents was that the Ford administration still recognized the 
need to stabilize Lebanon by dealing with Lebanon’s internal struggle for power. 
The motivation may have been to prevent a wider Arab-Israeli conflict but the 
means was still ending the Lebanese civil war via internal persuasions, hence the 
attempts to prevent Israel and Syria from entering the civil war.  The US feared a 
large scale Syrian intervention would invoke a larger Israeli military response.   
By the end of the Ford administration’s term, however, US stabilization 
and peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon started to unravel.  As the PLO and other 
left-leaning factions gained strength, the fragile stability of the agreements which 
the Ford administration brokered began to break.  In the interest of stabilizing 
Lebanon, the US, encouraged by Jordan’s King Hussein, acquiesced to and 
risked a large-scale Syrian intervention.  Since the Syrian intervention was 
against the PLO and the leftists, and since it was intended to protect the 
embattled Christians and the rightists, the US and Israel did not prevent the 
Syrian armed forces from engaging in the fighting.  
Syria’s large scale involvement was not received well by Egypt, Iraq, Libya 
and other Arab nations.  Egypt, Iraq, and Libya consequently joined forces 
against the Syrian move, and by association against the US and Israel, Jordan, 
and Saudi Arabia.  Many believed Syria’s involvement was part of a grand 
conspiracy led by Henry Kissinger.  Under the grand scheme, Syrian intervention 
would end the PLO, resolving Israel’s main problem. Israel would then give back 
the Golan Heights. Jordan would get the West Bank back; and the radicals and 
the communists will be out. Finally, Saudi Arabia would monopolize the oil 
industry; and American influence will prevail in the region.   
In the end, Syria’s involvement resulted in most of Lebanon coming under 
Syrian control while the fighting continued and even intensified. The promised 
stability did not materialize.  Further, the conflict clearly became internationalized.   
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D. THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION 
Henry Kissinger’s influence came to an abrupt end when President Jimmy 
Carter took office in 1977. United States’ policy moved further away from 
stabilizing the Lebanese crisis and moved towards regional peacemaking in the 
Middle East via finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.  The logic seemed to 
be that peace in the Middle East will eventually bring peace and stability to 
Lebanon.  As a result, active US engagement in trying to end the civil war was 
given less importance than forcing a peace treaty between Arabs, particularly 
Egypt, and Israelis. 
President Carter’s key advisers, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and 
National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, were also the key foreign policy 
decision makers. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Vice President Walter 
Mondale, while valuable in their areas were not particularly forceful in Middle 
East foreign policy making.  Immediately, the Carter administration embarked on 
a plan for a comprehensive Middle East peace based on three principles – need 
for concrete manifestations of peace (between Arab states and Israel), the need 
for security arrangements for all parties, and the need for a solution to the 
Palestinian problem (both political and humanitarian).  This trio of priorities came 
to be known as the trinity of peace, borders-security, and the Palestinian 
question.  President Carter himself met with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, 
Jordan’s King Hussein, Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd, and Syrian President Assad to 
advance a comprehensive peace agenda. 
Absent from the president’s comprehensive plan was facilitating an end to 
the Lebanese Civil War. At this point, US policy became so focused on the 
dynamics of inter-Arab relations that Lebanon was overlooked.  The civil war 
escalated with the Israeli army invasion of southern Lebanon in 1978 after Israeli 
civilians were allegedly killed in a PLO guerilla raid.  The Carter administration 
supported the deployment of a United Nations force (UNIFIL) in southern 
Lebanon to stabilize the area, but found little success. 
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It was during the Carter administration when Syria and Israel seemed to 
have free reign to independently pursuing their own agenda and policies.  There 
was limited engagement from the US.  The Carter administration was seemingly 
unable to cope with the realities of Lebanese and Middle East politics and simply 
watched while events happened.  For the most part, President Carter also was 
preoccupied with advancing human rights and forcing regimes in the Middle East 
to improve their human rights records.  In the meantime, Israel occupied most of 
southern Lebanon; and without much objection from the US, it organized a proxy 
Lebanese militia in the occupation zone. Syria, now with almost complete control 
of Lebanon, started flexing its muscles and was determined to gain hegemony 
over Lebanese politics.  In 1978, Syria started shelling Christians in east Beirut.  
Syria was previously allied with the Christians, pursuing goals similar to Israel’s.   
President Carter’s short term saw the US largely overlooking the tiny state 
in the Levant in favor of a comprehensive Middle East peace plan.  He was 
instrumental in forging bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel, and could take 
much credit for the Camp David Accords.  Achieving such peace, however, 
brought Israel’s focus from its southern front to the north towards Syria and 
Lebanon.  
 
E. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION  
The Reagan administration’s foreign policy toward developing states 
during the first few years of Reagan’s presidency (1981-1983) was characterized 
largely within the context of expansionist Soviet foreign policy.  Policy toward 
Lebanon was no exception. As early as his election campaign, Reagan stated: 
“The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren’t 
engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn’t be any hot spots in the 
world.”26 Reagan’s contempt for Soviet leaders’ foreign policies became 
apparently clear in his very first press conference after being sworn in as the 40th 
US president.  He charged that Soviet leaders “reserve unto themselves the right 
                                            
26 From an interview cited in Karen Elliott House, “Reagan’s World,” Wall Street Journal, 
June 3, 1980, p. 1. 
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to commit any crime—to lie, to cheat" to achieve "world revolution and a one-
world socialist or communist state."27 A few years later, he called the Soviet 
Union an “evil empire.”28  
He blamed the Soviet Union for the spread of regional unrests and he was 
dedicated to prevent the Soviets from gaining the upper hand in the US-Soviet 
rivalry.  Central to this goal was defense (rebuilding America’s military power) 
and support for states friendly to the US.  In Europe, this meant the introduction 
of “Peacekeeper” missiles with nuclear warheads that could reach the Soviet 
Union while also embarking on research and development of a Strategic Defense 
Initiative that could neutralize Soviet nuclear missiles coming into Europe and the 
United States.  In the Middle East, this meant military and economic support to 
governments willing to ally with the United States. In the early 1980’s, Lebanon’s 
Christian (Maronite)-led government became closely identified with accepting 
such US support. 
The Reagan administration, mostly through the United Nations (UN) and 
other international organizations, was regularly providing assistance for 
Lebanese reconstruction via Lebanon’s Council for Development and 
Reconstruction (CDR). In 1981, the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund 
was entrusted to carry out 43.5 million US dollars worth of special projects in the 
south through the CDR.  The UN Development Fund provided 4 million US 
dollars for reconstruction projects.  The US Agency for International Development 
also provided 5.7 million US dollars for housing projects, reconstruction, technical 
assistance, and other health projects.  
During Carter’s term, US foreign policy focus drifted away from bringing 
peace and stability in Lebanon as prerequisite to obtaining a broader Middle East 
peace.  In the Reagan administration, by roughly the middle of Reagan’s first 
term, peace and stability in Lebanon became synonymous to Arab-Israeli 
peacemaking.  A lasting peace in the Middle East would start with peace and 
                                            
27 White House Press Conference, January 29, 1981. 
28 From President Reagan’s “Evil Empire” speech, March 8, 1983. 
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stability in Lebanon.  Lebanon, as an Arab nation, was a step toward an Arab-
Israeli peace.   Lebanon went to the forefront of Arab-Israeli peace process.  The 
president was also committed to bringing democracy back to Lebanon and 
guarding it away from the Soviet orbit. 
Lebanon became the battleground for Arab-Israeli peace. Southern 
Lebanon, now the headquarters for the PLO, was the sight of intense hostilities 
between Israel, Israeli-backed militias, and the PLO. In 1982, Israel again 
invaded Lebanon after the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador to 
London. The Israeli army surrounded west Beirut and demanded the evacuation 
of the PLO and Syrians from Beirut.  France, the US, and Italy sent armed forces 
to oversee the evacuation of Palestinian forces. Yasser Arafat and most of his 
men were evacuated, leaving mostly women and children in the refugee camps.   
Several events in 1982 rocked the Reagan administration’s resolve. The 
main US supporter and open to Israeli support, president-elect Bashir Gemayel, 
was assassinated, leaving a void in the Phalange (Maronite Christian) faction’s 
leadership. Shortly thereafter, Israel struck back by sending Phalangist militias 
into the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Chatila and massacreing hundreds of 
civilians, the women and children who were left in the camps.  The US, France, 
and Italy were again forced to send a multinational force to help stabilize the 
situation and try to restore order to the war ravaged country. 
In 1983, the Reagan administration, mainly through the shuttle diplomacy 
of Secretary of State Shultz, came very close to forging an Israeli-Lebanese 
peace treaty.  In fact, Lebanon and Israel signed an agreement on May 17, 1983 
that could have ended the Israeli occupation then. Israeli withdrawal, however, 
was contingent upon the withdrawal of Syrian forces. Syria refused such 
condition, creating tensions on US-Syrian relationship. Previously, Syria and the 
US shared mutual goals of bringing peace and stability back to the Lebanese 
state.  With Syrian forces firmly in place inside Lebanon, Syrian interests dictated 
its continued presence would accomplish that goal better than leaving. 
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Take note however that such an Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty would 
have been between the Christian president Amin Gemayel, who took over from 
his murdered brother Bashir, and Israel, and arguably not between Lebanon and 
Israel. At this point, the Lebanese government had been closely identified as 
merely a faction advancing Maronite interests, and as a faction friendly to Israel.  
The Lebanese government had lost credibility, especially within its growing 
Moslem population. The Lebanese government troops were seen as Phalange 
militias fighting against Moslem militias.   
The Lebanese government’s credibility as championing the state’s 
interests presented serious problems for US policy. Who could the US 
government support?  Even with the Lebanese government now clearly identified 
with the Phalange faction, the US continued to support the remaining semblance 
of a legitimate state, the government of Amin Gemayel.  For the Reagan 
administration, Lebanon’s sovereignty rested with that “Phalangist” government.  
Lebanese Moslems, Druze, and other Christian factions fighting that government 
were therefore seen as on the wrong side of US policy.  The US could not afford 
Lebanon falling into communists or Muslim extremists’ control; and Amin 
Gemayel’s government was all they had.  
The Reagan administration, believing Amin Gemayel’s government would 
fall without US military help, approved the shelling of Moslem areas from US 
warships. Such action clearly identified the US as a cobelligerent (instead of a 
broker for peace) in the civil war on the side of Amin Gemayel’s Lebanese 
Christian forces. The US support for the Christian president was not seen as 
support for the Lebanese state, but rather support for the leader of the Phalange 
faction.   
Such support would cost the lives of many American service members 
and diplomats throughout 1983. On April 18, 1983, the US embassy was bombed 
by Lebanese allies of Iran; Syrian involvement was also suspected. It seemed 
Syria was determined to keep Lebanon in a state of chaos to keep any fighting 
and factionalism away from Syria itself.  Lebanon was the buffer from Israel and 
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the PLO and anybody else in the fight.  The embassy bombing cost the lives of 
63 people, seventeen of whom were Americans, and eight of them employees of 
the Central Intelligence Agency.   
On October 23, 1983, at 0620, a suicide bomber drove a delivery truck 
loaded with 12,000 pounds of chemical explosives to the US Marine compound 
at the Beirut airport.  The bomber detonated the explosives, collapsing the four 
story Marine headquarters building to rubble, and crushing many to death inside.  
A total of 242 people were killed – 220 US Marines, 18 Navy sailors, three Army 
soldiers, and one Lebanese.   The FBI reported this was the largest non nuclear 
explosion at that time.  
Up until the bombings, the Reagan administration’s resolve and intentions 
of preserving Lebanon’s sovereignty had been one of the main reasons for 
continued engagement in Lebanon. How would the bombings affect such 
resolve?  The Reagan administration was now facing a critical juncture in US 
history of involvement in the Middle East.  How it would react and what policies it 
would enact would greatly affect future policies and may potentially establish a 
dependent path that may limit the administration’s and other future policy makers’ 
policy options.  We shall explore that possibility in the next chapter.     
 
F. ASSESSING US POLICY TOWARD LEBANON FROM 1975 TO 1983 
During the period 1975 to 1983, Lebanon’s strategic importance was well 
established and US policy toward Lebanon generally reflected its importance. 
The Ford administration recognized the underlying problems of power politics 
among the various confessions within Lebanon. The Carter administration 
focused more on a comprehensive peace plan for the whole region that still 
indirectly included Lebanese peace albeit as a consequence of a broader Middle 
East peace.  The Reagan administration up to 1983 was deeply involved in trying 
to find a way to end the civil war and restoring order to the war ravaged country.      
The US seemed clearly committed to the sovereignty and independence 
of the Lebanese state.  The US wanted to bring back the pre-1975 democracy 
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that existed in Lebanon.  What was unclear in US policy however was an 
understanding of how to support the Lebanese state and how to help them effect 
that transition back to democracy.  United States policy makers seemed to have 
failed to realize the complexities of what the Ford administration called the first 
level or the first and foremost issue confronting the civil war — internal struggle 
for power.   
United States policy was focused more on inter-Arab relations and 
regional peace and security.  As such, the US concentrated on a broader Middle 
East strategy instead of sticking to stated goals of helping states friendly to the 
US.  Its foreign policy toward Lebanon became tied directly to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and was focused on finding a solution on that perceived larger issue.  As 
a result, it failed to formulate policies that could have better served the more 
relevant (as far as ending the civil war) Lebanese issue of internal struggle for 
power.  
Nevertheless, US intentions and conduct of foreign policy toward Lebanon 
were meant to uphold the Lebanese state’s independence and sovereignty.  
Lebanon’s historical and strategic importance to US national security strategies 
was the main reason for such policies.  In the next chapter, we shall explore if 
that reason still held after the 1983 bombings and determine if the ensuing 









































III. CRITICAL JUNCTURE AND PATH DEPENDENCE: US 
FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1983 TO PRESENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I analyze President Ronald Reagan’s policy shift 
introduced in the end of Chapter II and how it affected later foreign policies. I 
focus on analyzing path dependence and US foreign policy. I pose the following 
questions.  How did the 1983 policy change affect later policies?  Did the policy 
change “lock in” the US to a path dependent policymaking process based on a 
possibly misguided change?  What other implications are there, especially 
regarding the growth of terrorist organizations? 
I explore those questions by analyzing US foreign policy making toward 
Lebanon from the remainder of Reagan’s presidency (1983-1988) to presidents 
George H.W. Bush (1989-1992) and William Clinton (1993-2000), to the current 
administration’s view of the Middle East, in relation to US national security 
strategies.  My analysis of US foreign policy toward Lebanon during this period 
shows that there were many factors that weighed in formulating US policy.  
However, regardless of other factors that may have contributed to policymaking, 
the events of 1983, the Beirut bombings, continually affected policy formulation 
(or its non formulation).  
Prior to 1983 bombings, the US’ intentions and its conduct of foreign 
policy toward Lebanon were meant to uphold the Lebanese state’s independence 
and sovereignty. Lebanon was a free and democratic country throughout its 
modern history and the US government recognized it was in the US’ best 
interests to fully support Lebanon.  Its historical and strategic importance to US 
national security strategies was the main reason for favorable support.  In this 
chapter, I explore if that reason remained after the 1983 bombings, if the US still 




B. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (1983 – 1988)  
Initial reactions from the Reagan administration during the six months 
following the October 1983 attacks were meant to show US determination 
against what the US now called “terrorist activities.” High ranking US officials, 
including then vice president George H.W. Bush, visited Lebanon and the region 
to initiate talks with Middle East leaders.   
A series of National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) were 
immediately formulated and approved by the president.  NSDD 109, “Responding 
to the Lebanon Crisis,” was signed the same day as the Beirut bombings and 
specified the steps the US would take to respond to the terrorist attacks militarily. 
It also ordered a comprehensive security review of the US Multinational Force 
(MNF) contingent by a delegation led by General Kelley, and asked Kelley to 
“convey to the leadership of the Lebanese Armed Forces the urgent need to 
tighten security in the south Beirut area including closer collaboration with 
Lebanese security agencies and those confessional militias able to assist in 
controlling the movement of hostile terrorist factions.”29 NSDD 109 was 
particularly significant in that the US formally questioned the ability of the 
Lebanese government to maintain law and order. Further, in this document the 
US recognized and acknowledged confessional militias as relevant, not for 
ending the civil war, but as assets for protecting American lives. 
On 28 October 1983, the president signed NSDD 111, “Next Steps toward 
Progress in Lebanon and the Middle East,” in an effort “to regain the initiative in 
the Middle East by acting once more in a bold way, especially in the aftermath of 
the Beirut tragedies.”30  This directive affirmed the Reagan administration’s 
commitment to Lebanon’s independence and security, and vowed to use the full 
strength of the US to achieve its goal.  This directive also reaffirmed US support 
for the implementation of the May 17 Lebanon-Israel agreement.   
                                            
29 NSDD 109, October 23, 1983. 
30 NSDD 111, October 28, 1983. 
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NSDD 117, signed December 5, 1983, instructed the American contingent 
of the Multinational Force “to pursue a policy of vigorous self-defense against all 
attacks from any hostile quarter.”31 This was an escalation from NSDD 103, 
signed September 10, 1983, which stated US concept of operations “should be 
one of aggressive self-defense” and “should demonstrate … impartiality in the 
confessional conflict.”32  This directive authorized destructive fire against a full 
range of foreseeable threats regardless of who fired against US interests. It also 
pressured the Lebanese government to “undertake a more aggressive security 
posture in and around Beirut against radical Lebanese and foreign elements 
which pose a security risk to the MNF.”33  
Other directives and policy guidance followed. Each seemed to attempt to 
secure a handle on the Lebanese crisis, but each also brought potential 
unintended consequences. The focus of the directives became increasingly 
about combating terrorism and protecting US peacekeepers and other assets.  
Military operations, mainly bombings from US Navy destroyers, were approved 
for anti-terrorism reasons.  The military rules of engagement were focused on 
defending the official American presence in Lebanon; US naval and tactical air 
power could be employed at will and the military could fire at will when hostile fire 
directed at US personnel or facilities was identified.  Many rounds were fired, 
directed at terrorists, which also brought collateral damage.  In the process, US 
credibility as an honest broker for peace among the many factions fighting in 
Lebanon, as well as confidence in US commitment to Lebanese sovereignty, 
eroded.       
US foreign policy toward Lebanon after the October 1983 Beirut bombings 
and for the rest of Reagan’s presidency became characterized by increased 
cooperation with Israel and more overt hostility against Syria.  In the process, 
Lebanon was trapped in the middle of two powers vying for regional supremacy.  
Further, the US became more involved with Iran while waging a war against 
                                            
31 NSDD 117, December 5, 1983. Emphasis in the original. 
32 NSDD 103, September 10, 1983. 
33 NSDD 117, December 5, 1983. 
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terrorism.  Again, the future of the state of Lebanon was trapped in the middle as 
the radical group Hezbollah was funded and supported by Iran.  The rhetoric for 
supporting Lebanese sovereignty by US administration officials was still there; 
but the willingness to put words into action may have been insufficient.  
As the situation in Lebanon seemed hopeless, the US turned to Israel as 
its most reliable ally in the Middle East.  The Reagan administration, most 
notably Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, seemed to have 
determined a supportive US policy in Lebanon can only succeed through 
increased cooperation with Israel. NSDD 111 essentially defined an US strategic 
cooperation agreement with Israel.  The directive found it important for the US 
government to “undertake steps which will enhance the appeal of the 
government of Lebanon with the key factions who have not yet supported the 
GOL.”34  The directive specifically recognized “that Syria and Israel, as major 
neighboring powers, have interests in Lebanon’s future which cannot be ignored 
or dismissed.”35  To US policy makers, it was a choice between Israel or Syria 
regarding which could provide stability and be a unifying force. Israel was more 
familiar to the US and the US believed it could better influence it than it could 
Syria.   
With an increasingly pro-Israel stance, hostilities between Syria and the 
US could not be avoided.  The Reagan administration was convinced Syria had 
something to do with the Beirut bombings and resented Syria’s support for 
terrorist groups.   But Syria was still perceived as vital to the peace process, and 
the Reagan administration largely refrained from direct action against Syria.  
Instead, the administration let the Lebanese government do the fighting and 
concentrated on aiding the Lebanese government’s military in the fight.   
NSDD 123, signed by Reagan in February 1984, approved a military plan 
that provided for “possible actions the United States Government could take to 
assist the Government of Lebanon in responding to the changing threats and 
                                            
34 NSDD 111, October 28, 1983. GOL is the abbreviation for Government of Lebanon. 
35 Ibid. 
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military requirements.”36  Among other stipulations, the US was to provide 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism training, modern artillery ammunition, 
and other US equipment in order to deter firing on greater Beirut from Syrian-
controlled areas.   The directive also authorized “U.S. naval forces to provide 
naval gunfire and air support against any units in Syrian-controlled territory in 
Lebanon firing into greater Beirut ….”37  
By early 1984, Reagan was faced with making a crucial decision at a 
critical juncture.  The US’ military and diplomatic efforts were not yielding desired 
results.  In addition, Reagan was facing reelection in the US and could not afford 
to make more mistakes in the Lebanese crisis. During a National Security 
Council (NSC) meeting in January 1984, the president asked the Secretary of 
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to develop a 
timetable for the phasing down of USMNF ashore while still planning for a 
continued presence offshore.  
By the end of February, the Reagan administration accepted the fluidity of 
the situation in Lebanon.  The administration could do nothing to stop Syria from 
forcing Lebanon to abrogate the May 17 Lebanon-Israel Agreement.  Lebanon 
abrogated in exchange for Syria’s guarantee of a cease fire and support for a 
government of national unification.  The Reagan administration also recognized 
its shortcoming in credibility.  In NSDD 128, Reagan asked for a plan to bolster 
confidence in US commitments in the Middle East because of “the serious 
developments in Lebanon and the perceived erosion of U.S. credibility ….”38 
Such a plan did not materialize. 
By April 1984, the withdrawal of all US military personnel, ashore and 
offshore, became imminent.  As Reagan was sending the US Congress “four 
separate bills to attack the pressing and urgent problem of international 
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terrorism,”39 US military personnel were abandoning its failed Lebanon 
peacekeeping mission. 
Reagan signed one more directive directly involving US policy toward 
Lebanon before his second term expired, NSDD 149 “Support to Government of 
Lebanon in Planning for Counter Terrorism Operations.”  This directive, signed in 
November 1984, is still classified.  No doubt influenced by the catastrophic US 
experience in Lebanon, Reagan approved many other directives involving US 
policy in combating international terrorism. This included NSDD 176, “Combatting 
Terrorism in Central America,” signed in July 1985, NSDD 205, “Acting against 
Libyan Support of International Terrorism,” signed in January 1986, and NSDD 
207, “The National Program for Combatting Terrorism,” also signed in January 
1986.  
 
C. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989 – 1992)  
United States policy toward Lebanon and the Middle East under President 
George H.W. Bush’s Administration was conducted with extreme caution. There 
were no grand schemes and there were no big plans.  The Bush administration 
probed cautiously to avoid heightening expectations.  There was a conscious 
effort however to understand the realities of Middle East politics.   
This low key and cautious approach brought considerable success for 
progressing peace in the region.  Under the astute negotiating and deal-making 
of Secretary of State James Baker, the Bush administration was credited with 
opening the way for Israelis and Arabs to come to the peace table.  Baker 
brokered many conferences in a short period of time, culminating in the historic 
October 1991 Madrid conference.   
Success in the Arab-Israeli conflict did not always translate to favorable 
consequences for US-Lebanese relationship. Even the historic Madrid 
conference only brought a small potential gain for Lebanon.  The number of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon who would be able to go back to Palestine if an 
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Arab-Israeli peace agreement was concluded was not significant.  On the other 
hand, progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict meant shifting the focus away from 
Lebanon and sidestepping these other problems. Arguably, the US could have 
made substantial contributions to these issues. Instead, they became lost 
opportunities. 
 With the trauma of the Beirut bombings still fresh in the American public’s 
mind, the Bush administration was not ready to re-engage Lebanon.  The 
administration did not begin any separate initiatives to improve US-Lebanese 
relations.  Lebanon just concluded a long and bloody civil war where the US 
became a belligerent and paid the cost of such involvement.  The US was not 
about to become involved again.  At best, policy toward Lebanon was simply 
linked to the overall Middle East peace process.  At worst, Lebanon was ignored 
and considered untouchable. 
Lebanon may have become too difficult to justify as a national security 
interest.  The Cold War was over; and the threat of Soviet expansion was no 
longer a viable reason for action.  Protecting an inexpensive and stable supply of 
oil from the region was still a US national security interest, but Lebanon was not 
an oil-producing state. Lebanon therefore did not constitute a US strategic 
interest regarding oil.  Absent a clear public justification for action, and 
considering the fear of risking and losing American lives to terrorist actions, the 
Bush administration largely ignored Lebanon.  
The US removed itself from influencing Lebanon’s future and left Syria to 
take the lead.  The Ta’if Agreement of 1989 effectively ended the civil war by 
establishing special relations between Lebanon and Syria. Syrian forces would 
stay in place to provide stability for two years, after which the Syrian and 
Lebanese governments would negotiate Syrian withdrawal. General Michel 
Aoun, head of the Lebanese government at that time, vehemently opposed the 
agreement, fearing the Syrians would not leave. He argued that the political 
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reforms were not acceptable.40  Nevertheless, the Lebanese parliament 
accepted the Ta’if Agreement.  Aoun was later ousted from power. 
The 1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent formation of a US-
led coalition to liberate Kuwait compounded the complexity of US-Lebanese 
relations. Eager to bring Syria into the coalition, the Bush administration was 
willing to ignore Syrian hegemony over a supposedly independent and sovereign 
Lebanese state.       
Convinced the Bush administration lacked the will to object and become 
involved, Syria further fortified its hold on Lebanon with a series of treaties and 
security arrangements.  The May 1991 Lebanon-Syria Treaty of Brotherhood, 
Cooperation, and Coordination mandated full coordination in practically all 
aspects of state governance, including political, economic, scientific, industrial, 
security, and other fields. In September 1991, Lebanon and Syria signed the 
Lebanon-Syria Defense and Security Agreement, strengthening Syria’s military 
grip, ensuring Lebanon does not become a threat to Syria’s security, and 
introducing restrictions and media censorship.  The Lebanese government 
acquiesced to these treaties. 
Lebanon came under Syrian hegemony politically under the guise of being 
the arbiter of Lebanon’s warring factions.  Over 30,000 Syrian military personnel 
stayed in Lebanon to protect such hegemony. The Israeli military was also in 
Lebanon but could not exercise influence in the government.  The Israeli military 
vowed to stay until the Syrian army left.  Fighting continued with the Shi’ite 
radical group Hezbollah, backed by Syria and Iran, taking the lead in opposing 
the Israelis and their proxies. Hezbollah’s unconventional tactics of suicide 
bombing and hostage taking in the 1980’s qualified them as a terrorist 
organization.  Lebanon became notorious in the US as a safe haven for 
international terrorism.      
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The Bush administration’s policy toward Lebanon and the Syrian 
occupation was predicated on a misguided belief that Syria would abide by the 
Ta’if Accords.  In the summer of 1992, Secretary of State Baker and Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Edward Djerejian 
met with Syrian and Lebanese officials in Damascus to discuss the redeployment 
of Syrian troops from Lebanon per the Ta’if Accords and in preparation for 
Lebanon’s upcoming parliamentary elections.  However, the Syrian military 
remained. 
 
D. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION (1993 – 2000) 
Clinton’s speeches during his presidential election campaign brought hope 
that his future administration would again realize Lebanon’s historic and strategic 
importance and provide assistance in Lebanon’s reconstruction. Criticizing the 
Bush administration in a gathering of Lebanese Americans, Clinton stated: "The 
Bush administration appears willing to sacrifice the prospects for an independent 
Lebanon in order to curry favor with Syria's dictator."41 He added: "the withdrawal 
of Syrian troops is essential to Lebanon's regaining its independence." 42 
 Clinton’s words were simply campaign rhetoric. Once in office, the Clinton 
administration did very little to advance the American Lebanese cause.  Other 
than discussions of when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright would lift the 
travel ban for tourists and businesses, including discussions of allowing 
American businesses to set up in Lebanon, the Clinton administration passed up 
on the opportunity to help build a democratic Lebanon. Like Reagan six months 
after the bombing and Bush throughout his short term, the Clinton administration 
was stuck in the dependent path of doing nothing and subsuming Lebanon’s 
interests under the larger Arab-Israeli peace process. Almost 10 years after the 
Beirut bombings, the Clinton administration was still unwilling to get involved in a 
country once considered a vital interest. 
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With the executive branch unwilling to take on Lebanon, the legislative 
branch took the lead in promulgating policy.  Throughout the 1990’s, legislators, 
many of them of Lebanese descent, took on the cause of some Lebanese 
Americans. US foreign policymaking toward Lebanon shifted from the executive 
to the legislative branch. 
Intense lobbying by Lebanese-American groups resulted in congressional 
hearings. In June 1997, Representative Benjamin A. Gilman of New York 
conducted a hearing on US policy toward Lebanon before the Committee on 
International Relations in the US House of Representatives. Top witnesses 
included Amin Gemayel, the former president of Lebanon, Peter Tanous, the 
founding chairman of American Task Force for Lebanon, Daniel Nassif from the 
Council of Lebanese-American Organizations, and Daniel Pipes, then editor of 
the Middle East Quarterly. These witnesses repeatedly argued for US 
engagement in the reconstruction of Lebanon and asked the US Congress to 
help restore its independence and sovereignty. 
Representatives from the state department also tried to convince 
Congress that the executive branch was doing all it could, in their own way, to 
assist Lebanon.  In the 1997 hearing, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for 
Near Eastern Affairs, Mr. David Welch, argued that “US policy toward Lebanon 
remains firmly committed to its unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity.”43  It was, however, up to Lebanon to work toward their own “political 
and economic objectives through reconstruction, national reconciliation, 
adherence to free markets;” while the US “continues to work hard to achieve a 
comprehensive regional peace and to help Lebanon recover from civil war.”44 
The tone of Mr. Welch’s testimony seemed to suggest there was no immediate 
need to directly assist Lebanon, and that a regional strategy was preferred.  
When asked about Syria’s alleged violation of the Ta’if Accords, Welch’s choice 
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of words suggested direct engagement with Lebanon was still off-limits for fear of 
alienating Syria and losing its support in the Arab-Israeli peace process.  
The Clinton administration’s efforts in advancing the Arab-Israeli peace 
process through Syria came to an end after the failed summit between Clinton 
and Syrian President Hafez Assad in March 2000.  Further, the unilateral 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from south Lebanon in May 2000 removed one of the 
main reasons for the Syrian military’s stay in Lebanon.  But Syria continued to be 
an important state in the Clinton administration’s Middle East policy, which made 
policy making toward Lebanon a sensitive task.  Lebanon’s independence and 
sovereignty could wait a little longer. 
The congressional hearings resulted in the formulation of proposals on 
how the US could help in Lebanon’s reconstruction as well as formulating a 
proposed US policy toward the country. In June 1999, Representative Michael P. 
Forbes introduced H.R. 2056, the Lebanon Independence Restoration Act of 
1999, in the first session of the 106th Congress.  It proposed to establish US 
policy “regarding the necessity of requiring the full withdrawal of all Syrian 
military, security, intelligence and proxy forces from Lebanon and the restoration 
of Lebanon's independence.”45  The proposal did not become law that year but 
laid the foundation for the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty 
Restoration Act of 2003, signed into public law in December 2003 under the 
Bush administration. 
 
E. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2001 – PRESENT) 
Early in the Bush administration’s term, the executive branch seemed 
poised to follow previous US policy and continue to pay lip service to supporting 
Lebanon’s sovereignty.  It seemed to have accepted Syria’s hegemony over the 
country. In 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell abruptly canceled his 
scheduled visit to Beirut after meeting with Syrian officials about the situation in 
south Lebanon.  Both Lebanese government officials and the opposition viewed  
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the cancellation as a major tilt toward Syria and against Lebanon.  It was evident 
that the Bush administration was courting Syria for its support in building a 
coalition against Iraq.  
Things changed after the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 
2001. The Bush administration had justification to pursue a clear strategy on 
foreign policy and wage a global war on terrorism. To protect national security, 
the Bush administration advocated a more offensive posture that included the 
right to engage in preemptive strikes. In what has become known as the Bush 
doctrine, the US national security strategy aimed to fight international terrorism, 
especially the state sponsored variety, which included countries harboring 
terrorists.  Another goal of the national security strategy was to promote greater 
freedom worldwide through democratic reforms, free enterprise, and the 
elimination of groups or nations that organize with the intention to stifle that 
progress through radical means.   
The new grand strategy was heavily influenced by political morality, and 
greatly affected present and future policy actions toward the Middle East peace 
process as well as Lebanon. The Bush administration’s foreign policy position 
institutionalized its moral commitment to support democratic rule, advance 
freedom, and increase emphasis on state independence and sovereignty.  In a 
speech in November 2003, the president stated “the United States has adopted a 
new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East” and that “the 
advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country.”46  
In the new Bush administration strategy, the moral cause of advancing 
freedom and fighting global terrorism were enough justification for US 
intervention.  There were essentially two possible outcomes tied to this strategy 
for the peace process.  It could culminate with a peaceful solution between two 
nations (Israel and Palestine) or it will continue to propagate hatred, terrorism, 
and ethnic conflict, not only among the key nations involved, but also among 
those who sympathize with one side or the other from within the nations.     
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For Lebanon, the Bush administration’s position provided an opening for 
changing its path and re-defining policy toward Lebanon.  The events of 
September 11, 2001 constituted a critical juncture and the Bush doctrine that 
evolved presented another possible path the Bush administration could take.  By 
taking on terrorism, the “hands off” approach to Lebanon previous 
administrations followed could be altered.  In September 2001, almost 18 years 
after the Beirut bombings, the effects and influence of Reagan’s “cut and run” 
policy in 1984 could now be reversed. 
By May 2003, Powell stated that Lebanon “could be a model for 
democracy and free trade in the region” and that the US “supports an 
independent and prosperous Lebanon, free of all, all foreign forces.”47  He stated 
these words following his meeting with Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, 
speaker of Parliament Nabil Berri, and Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, the Lebanese 
triumvirate leadership. Powell also recognized the need for considering 
Lebanese concerns in the Middle East process.  He stated that “there has to be 
another track in addition to the track that is laid out clearly in the roadmap, there 
has to be another track that deals with Syrian concerns and Lebanese 
concerns”48  While still a part of a comprehensive Middle East approach, 
Lebanon was becoming an integral part. 
Congressional leadership continued to be engaged in shaping US policy 
toward Lebanon under the Bush administration.  More congressional hearings 
followed the 1997 ones when former president Amin Gemayel spoke, including 
one in 2003 when General Aoun was the key witness. The result was the passing 
of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003.  
The act was signed into public law by the president on December 12, 2003, and 
became Public Law No. 108-175.  This law aims “to halt Syrian support for 
terrorism, end its occupation of Lebanon, stop its development of weapons of 
mass destruction, cease its illegal importation of Iraqi oil, and hold Syria 
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accountable for its role in the Middle East, and for other purposes.”49  The 
implications of this law would be discussed further in Chapter V. 
The Bush administration was also actively advocating Lebanese 
independence and sovereignty in the international community.  Together with 
France, the US sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1559, calling for “the 
strict respect of Lebanon’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political 
independence under the sole and exclusive authority of the government of 
Lebanon throughout Lebanon.”50 Specifically aimed at trying to prevent an 
impending parliamentary vote on a constitutional amendment to permit Syrian-
backed Lebanese president Emile Lahoud to extend his term, the resolution 
stated the Lebanese presidential election should be “free and fair … according to 
Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence.”51 
Despite the resolution, Lebanon’s parliament still voted to amend their 
constitution to permit Lahoud to stay another three years.   
 
F. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEBANON 
In the years following the 1983 Beirut bombings, US policy toward 
Lebanon changed from full support of Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence 
to acquiescing to Syrian hegemony over the country.  Faced with the possibility 
of confronting terrorism, the US followed a cautious approach and largely 
subsumed US interests in Lebanon to US interests in a broader Middle East 
peace process.  In the process, Lebanon was largely ignored in favor of 
appeasing Syria.  I do not believe that was the right path to take and I believe the 
US lost an opportunity in the 1980’s and 1990’s to shape Middle East politics. 
The historic and strategic importance of Lebanon remained the same 
before and after the 1983 bombings.  Lebanon’s importance geographically 
never changed, it still presented strategic opportunities for the US.  It was still a 
potential gateway to the Arab world (through the Mediterranean) with seaports 
                                            
49 Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003. 
50 UN Security Council Resolution 1559, September 2, 2004. 
51 Ibid. 
41 
and airports that were ideal forward operating bases and ports of debarkation.  
Lebanon could still strengthen US strategic position in the Levant and could 
widen US influence in the Mediterranean front, and could better serve US 
interests in the global war on terror. 
Lebanon maintains the historical basis and institutions to be potentially 
stable, democratic, and friendly to the West. It is widely believed that the only US 
interest in the Middle East is oil. While Lebanon is not an oil producing country 
and Lebanon did not constitute a strategic interest because of oil, there are still 
economic interests. A stable and democratic Lebanon with a free market 
economy is a potential intermediary between the West and the Middle East 
nations.  Lebanon served the role of a merchant nation before and it could fit in to 
that role again.  The US made a commitment toward spreading democracy, most 
especially in the Middle East.  As I argued in the previous chapter, Lebanon is 
still the best candidate and arguably a less costly way of propagating democratic 
peace.  Democracy in Lebanon would be a substantial step in winning the war on 
terrorism.   
Many argued that US failure to confront terrorism after the 1983 Beirut 
bombings emboldened terrorism and the use of terrorist tactics.  Scott Dodd and 
Peter Smolowitz stated that while the “Beirut bombing taught the United States 
more about protecting troops and picking battles,” the “1983 Beirut bombing 
began a new era of terror.”52  They argued: “The bombing drove the military from 
its peacekeeping mission in Lebanon and provided a blueprint for attacking 
Americans. The retreat of U.S. forces inspired Osama bin Laden and sent an 
unintended message to the Arab world that enough body bags would prompt 
Western withdrawal, not retaliation.”53 
Dodd and Smolowitz quoted John Lehman, the Secretary of the Navy 
during the 1983 bombing, a saying “There’s no question it was a major cause of 
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9-11; we told the world that terrorism succeeds.”54 Robin Wright agrees with 
Lehman’s statements.  She characterizes the bombings as “pure terror” and “the 
seeds that we now see played out in so many countries in so many parts of the 
Islamic world.”55 She stated that the redeployment of the Marines constituted a 
“cut and run” approach and “showed that extremist tactics can be effective in 
intimidating nations to leave.”56 Osama bin Laden reportedly told ABC News in 
1998 that American soldiers were “paper tigers,” and that “Marines fled after two 
explosions.”57  
Until Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan in 2001, US 
responses to terrorism were minimal and generally reflected a “cut and run” 
policy and avoidance of the military option.  Terrorists attacked the US embassy 
in Kuwait in 1984, hijacked TWA Flight 847 in 1985, taking hostages and killing a 
sailor, exploded Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland in 1988, killing 270, bombed 
the World Trade Center in 1993, killing six and wounding hundreds, bombed the 
US military base in Saudi Arabia in 1996, killing 19 and wounding 370, attacked 
the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, killing 307, and struck the 
USS Cole in Yemen in 2000, killing 17 sailors.  
I agree with Wright, Dodd, Smolowitz, and Lehman, but only on a 
theoretical level.  Direct connections between the 1983 Beirut bombings and the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US can only be posited, not proven, 
at this point.  However, the lack of engagement on the US part contributed to 
Lebanon’s status as a weak state without effective control over its entire territory, 
making it a potential theater for terrorism.   
The Bush administration’s actions after the September 11, 2001 bombings 
greatly affected its actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the 
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region as a whole.  It could also be a critical juncture for US policy toward 
Lebanon, an opportunity that could pave the way for a new path of engagement 
and better serve US strategic goals. It is imperative the Bush administration take 
a closer look at its policies toward Lebanon and not miss this opportunity.   
There are two controversial issues confronting the Bush administration 
and US-Lebanon relations.  Both are directly related to the global war on 
terrorism.  The first is the Islamic group Hezbollah.  Hezbollah was widely linked 
to the Beirut bombings and using terrorist tactics.  Hezbollah, its transformation 
to a political force in Lebanon and its implications to US foreign policy toward 
Lebanon, are discussed in the next chapter.  The second issue is the 
implementation of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty 
Restoration Act of 2003.  While the initiative came from the legislature, its 
implementation rests with the executive.  Both the Clinton and the Bush 
administrations were initially opposed to such legislation.  Bush signed this into 
law in December 2003; major issues and disagreements between Congress and 
the Bush administration remain regarding its implementation.  These are 
















































IV. THE BEGINNING AND THE ONGOING TRANSFORMATION 
OF LEBANON’S “HEZBOLLAH,” THE PARTY OF GOD 
   
A. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. State Department’s “Pattern of Global Terrorism 2003” identifies 
four Middle East nations — Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria — as state sponsors of 
terrorism. Two of these four, Iran and Syria, are widely linked to Lebanon, a 
nation the US State Department considers problematic for its refusal to take 
actions against terrorist elements in its country. Foremost of these terrorist 
elements is Hezbollah. According to Deputy Secretary of State Richard, 
Hezbollah and not al-Qaeda “may well be the A-team of international 
terrorism.”58   
On the other hand, the Lebanese government insists Hezbollah is not a 
terrorist organization. Hezbollah contends its purpose is resistance to the Israeli 
occupation. Together they point to Hezbollah’s work in the community and 
successes in parliamentary and local elections as proofs that Hezbollah is now 
heavily entrenched in the Lebanese political system and have gained 
considerable stake in the democratic process for it to be a terrorist group.    
This chapter will trace the transformation of Hezbollah’s ideology and its 
views regarding revolution — its shift from nonviolent political Islamism to more 
radical strains of Islamist activism in the 80’s and 90’s and its gradual shift back 
to political Islamism in the late 90’s to today. This chapter will track the changes 
— from its beginnings in Imam Sayyid Musa al-Sadr’s ideology and the Amal 
movement, to its revolutionary ideology in Sheikh Sayyid Muhammad Hussein 
Fadlallah and Ayatollah Khomeini and manifested in its positions during the 
Lebanese Civil War; and finally to its evolution as a legitimate political party, 
actively participating in and accepted in the Lebanese social and political 
systems. 
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It is important to take note of these changes in Hezbollah, for they reveal 
golden opportunities for policy makers to re-evaluate their positions in Middle 
East politics and valuable in tackling the larger issue of contending with Shi’ite 
fundamentalism while pursuing stated US national security strategy of 
propagating liberal democracy and free enterprise in the Middle East. 
 
B. FROM QUIETISM TO RADICALISM 
Radical Shi’ite fundamentalism in Lebanon would have been very unlikely 
prior to the 1960’s. Pursuing ideas such as the violent overthrow of government, 
forceful demand for equal representation, and revolution in the Marxist sense 
were simply not in Lebanese Shi’ite tradition. For centuries, these Shi’ites were 
taught that their survival depended on maintaining the restraint imposed on them 
by their religion — faith should be kept separate from politics since politics will 
contaminate the religion. Religious leaders were not expected to rule, so as not 
to antagonize ruling government; but instead, they were expected to concentrate 
on religious doctrines and keeping extremist ideas out of the community.  
The Shi’ites were cautious and quiescent to ensure their unity and 
survival. They kept their unity through their communal grief and quiescence, 
following the example of their fourth Imam, Imam Zayn al Abidin, who, after his 
father Husayn was massacred in Karbala, ensured the survival of the Shi’ites and 
their religion by accepting the realities that they were no match against their 
opponents, the Islamic (Sunni) state based in Damascus.  
The Shi’ites of Lebanon had learned to live in the shadows of alien 
powers, even fellow Muslims (Sunni) to ensure their survival. They were good 
citizens, not causing trouble but preaching harmony and living a pious life, mostly 
in agriculture. Their government however took advantage and took the quiet 
Shi’ite community for granted. The Shi’ites were left in poverty; their social and 
political life seriously deteriorated. But in those conditions, they still accepted 
their fate and unified in their communal grief; until Imam Sayyid Musa al-Sadr 
came and showed them the possibility of living a pious, but better life, in a 
modern world.    
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Imam Musa al-Sadr took the position of Islamic Shi’ite religious leader in 
the southern city of Tyre in 1960. He was not considered an Imam then but his 
followers soon bestowed him the title, despite a foreign birthplace. He came from 
Iran, a place called Qum, where it was prophesied that a man of faith would 
come from to lead a rebellion.  He was, however, of Lebanese ancestry; and 
claimed a distinguished line of descent in both his maternal and paternal lineage.  
He was well educated in the faith, well traveled, and very charismatic. From the 
beginning, he immediately felt something was simply not right in Lebanon. He 
quickly saw the inequalities of the Lebanese confessional system, and the grave 
social, political, and living conditions the Shi’ites of Lebanon were facing.    
Imam al-Sadr embarked on improving the life of the Shi’ites. He gave 
them hope by calling them by a new name — Shi’ites of Lebanon; and linked 
them with a broader Shi’ite community outside Lebanon (in Iran and Iraq). Then 
he worked within the Lebanese system to try to elevate their social and living 
conditions. He was distinguished by his political openness, especially towards 
Christians, and for founding many social institutions, vocational schools, and 
health clinics.   
The Shi’ites were underrepresented in government and they did not have 
the political voice the other two sects, Christians and Sunni Muslims, enjoyed in 
their Higher Councils. So he founded the Higher Islamic Shi’ite Council in 1969 
and became its chairman.59  To improve the standing of Shi’ites, he worked side 
by side with Christian priests and bishops, and even gave a sermon in a 
Christian church. He also founded the “Movement of the Deprived” to get the 
government to address the needs of the Shi’ites in the rural areas. He worked 
tirelessly to improve the social, political, and living conditions of the Shi’ites. In 
the process, he provided a different Shi’ite ideology from what the Shi’ites 
traditionally believed.  
Imam al-Sadr showed the Shi’ites that it was acceptable to live not in 
constant grief and repression and instead to strive for a better life. In a way, he 
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provided “militancy” when there was only quiescence. Ajami described it as 
seeking “to change the stagnant Shia tradition, to strip it of its sorrow and 
quiescence, to make it come to terms with the world.”60  His ideology, however, 
rested within the framework of the law and cooperation with the government, and 
the unity of Lebanon as an independent state.61 He called for the Shi’ites to look 
within and find their rightful place in the Lebanese state by working through the 
Lebanese system, not overthrowing it.   
Unfortunately Imam al-Sadr mysteriously vanished in August 1978 during 
a visit to Libya. To date, nobody has publicly stated what really happened 
although many blame Qadafi. His legacy however remained and greatly 
influenced the birth of Hezbollah. 
 
C. IRANIAN INFLUENCE AND SHEIKH FADLALLAH 
Hezbollah as an organized entity was not born during the time of Imam al-
Sadr. It was not until the early middle part of the Lebanese Civil War when 
Hezbollah emerged. With help from Iran, Hezbollah was founded in 1982 during 
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon.  
What Imam al-Sadr founded was a movement called Amal.  Amal, which 
also means “hope,” is an acronym for Afwaj al Muqawamah al Lubnanya, the 
Units of the Lebanese Resistance.  It was intended to be an auxiliary to the 
Lebanese army in the south; and followed Imam al-Sadr’s moderate ideology.  In 
time however, it became apparent to many Shi’ites that Amal’s moderate stance 
was not gaining them any ground, and in fact losing them the civil war to a 
foreign entity, the Israelis.62  Many turned to Hezbollah.  
                                            
60 Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), 219. 
61 Imam al-Sadr was just and he advocated peaceful means.  But he was not naïve; he was 
preparing an armed militia at the same time that he was preaching for peace and unity.  He was 
well aware of the realities of the civil war and he warned against Israeli aggression. 
62 Amal was the main organization representing the Shiites.  Hezbollah emerged from that 
group. 
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Hezbollah emerged with an immediate goal of forcing the Israeli military 
out of southern Lebanon. The long-term goal, however, was greater and radical. 
It is to mimic the success of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution and create an 
Islamic state in Lebanon. 
With Imam al-Sadr’s disappearance, Sayyid Muhammad Hussein 
Fadlallah gained most of the imam’s influence and following. Under his spiritual 
leadership, Shiite ideology became more militant. Sheikh Fadlallah came with a 
more radical method — purist, and imposing strict order of zeal and conformity. 
Many Shi’ites saw this as the only way, especially in Lebanon’s environment of 
antagonistic sects.  The Shi’ites of Lebanon needed to rule their own state, an 
Islamic state, patterned after Iran, which had staged a successful rebellion. Many 
Shi’ites’ ideology was thus transformed from traditional political quietism, to Imam 
al-Sadr’s “enlightened” way, and then to Sheikh Fadlallah’s “doctrine of rebellion 
and confrontation.”   
To Sheikh Fadlallah and his followers, the change in doctrine was justified. 
Islam has a tradition of “enjoining the good and forbidding the evil.”  He preached 
that in forbidding evil, the Shi’ites could resort to armed power to change social 
and political conditions; the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions did so. 
Much more, he preached that God loves strength and force; that the strong pious 
person was more pleasing to God than the weak pious one. There was a need 
for the acquisition of power for maintaining the proper conditions for living a good 
and pious life, and for creating and defending a Muslim order. These were not 
traditional Shi’ite ideas; but many embraced them.  
As for separating religion from politics, the community was not deviating 
from religion when they interfere in politics — Muhammad was both a ruler and 
religious guide, the Shi’ites’ Imam Ali fulfilled the same. As for the quiescence of 
the fourth Imam, Imam Zayn Al Abidin, and the Imams who followed him, Sheikh 
Fadlallah maintained that the Imams knew beforehand that struggle was doomed 
to failure so they counseled against it for the good of the community. He believes 
that the avoidance of struggle cannot be a permanent response to injustice; and 
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that it was the Shi’ites’ duty to fight for the community when the chances were 
right. Under Sheikh Fadlallah, a Lebanese Shi’ism with a revolutionary 
philosophy emerged, embraced by Hezbollah.   
 
D. THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR  
Hezbollah’s revolutionary philosophy can be clearly seen in the positions 
the organization took during the Lebanese Civil War. The increasingly desperate 
economic situation, combined with the revolutionary ideology gaining prevalence, 
led to radical positions.  
By the mid-1980’s, the Lebanese Civil War effectively collapsed the 
Lebanese economy. Its gross domestic product was one third its original level, 
the national income per capita was barely one tenth of what it was in the early 
1980’s, the rate of exchange for the Lebanese pound plummeted against the 
dollar and other currencies, and the reserves were depleted. Unemployment was 
up, emigration was down (significantly reducing income from remittances), real 
wages were considerably down, and prospects for industrialization were nil.   
 The grave economic conditions, together with deteriorated social 
conditions fueled the never-ending internal war (that has been going on since the 
mid 1970’s) between the warring factions—the leftist antigovernment pan Arab 
camp, the Lebanese National Movement, against the conservative highly 
nationalistic rightist camp, the Lebanese Front. 
 Hezbollah was in the pan Arab camp. It was allied with Amal, the 
Progressive Socialist Party, the Syrian National Socialist Party, the Independent 
Nasserists, the Lebanese Communist Party, and the Ba’ath Socialist Party. They 
were fighting against the Kata’ib, the National Liberal Party, and the Zghorta 
Liberation Army. Within each group, total alliance was far from solid; their goals 
were fragmented.  
Hezbollah’s end goal was an Islamic Republic of Lebanon.  To achieve 
that goal, the group advocated the following positions:  
- Overthrow Maronite control of government 
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- Equal representation 
- Eradicate Western influence 
- Full scale resistance against Israel 
- Close relations with Syria 
- Support for the Palestinian cause 
- Prevent the Palestinian Liberation Organization from moving back in to 
Lebanon 
- Close ties with the Islamic regime of Iran. 
The first and foremost goal was the overthrow of Maronite control over the 
government and lands of Lebanon. For Hezbollah, the grave economic and 
social conditions proved the government’s gross incompetence. They held the 
Maronites responsible for the civil unrest and the eruption of violence. They also 
considered the government corrupt. Further, the Maronite government was seen 
as cooperating with the Israelis.   
The government’s inability to provide basic social services led the Shi’ites 
to organize their own village cells and communities in order to satisfy basic 
needs. It is in these communities that Hezbollah gained prominence. It provided 
social services, security and protection that the Maronite government could or 
would not provide. These communities later came under Hezbollah control. 
On the equal representation issue, Hezbollah supported the pan Arab 
camp’s demand for the revision of the unwritten National Pact of 1943 to reflect 
the degree of influence that the Shi’ite community, the “real” Lebanese (in their 
view), should hold. This meant revising not only the words of the National Pact 
but also ensuring equitable representation. They wanted to make clear that 
‘Lebanon is an Arab Country, a founder member of the Arab League, and is 
bound by all the obligations of that membership.’ The connotations of these 
words are tremendous as they imply full Arab membership and the eradication of 
western influence. The National Pact of 1943 implied Lebanon as an Arab 
country with a Western aspect. 
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The actual governing of the nation was also disputed. While Hezbollah 
continued its quest for an Islamic state, the realities of what it could negotiate led 
it to support lesser goals. Hezbollah supported changing the ratio of Christian 
and Muslim representation in the parliament from 6:5 in favor of Christians (as 
taken from the outdated and questionable 1932 census) to at least equal 
representation between Christians and Muslims. This was because the Muslims 
were believed to be the majority in population and thus entitled to equal 
representation with the Christians. The change in representation would flow 
down to other areas of the government also, in addition to reconstituting the 
Lebanese Army to reflect this representation. 
Hezbollah had maintained a hard line approach against the Israelis from 
the start. It was one of the main reasons why the organization broke away from 
Amal. The arrival of Israeli soldiers was first seen as liberation — Israel was 
helpful in driving the Palestinians away from Lebanese Shi’ite land — and Amal 
tried to prevent Israeli attacks that would kill innocent Shi’ites. Many interpreted 
this as willingness to cooperate with the enemy, and weakened Amal’s support 
among the Shi’ites. 
Hezbollah rejected any compromise with the Lebanese Christians, Israel, 
and the West. It advocated full resistance against Israel because they believed 
Israel displaced the Palestinians from their land, causing the Palestinians to take 
refuge in Lebanon and making it their base of resistance. The result was Israel 
continuously attacking Lebanon. Israel allegedly also had ulterior motives on 
Lebanese land and resources.63   
Hezbollah’s pro Arab stance brought it close to Syria, who represented the 
greater Arab Muslim world in Lebanon. Hezbollah considered Lebanon part of 
the Muslim world and so it supported Arab unity and nationalism. The Palestinian 
cause was a central issue in the pan Arab camp; they wanted the Palestinians to 
have their own state. Hezbollah, however, did not want Lebanon to be the killing 
fields so they resented both the Israelis and the Palestinians, especially their 
                                            
63 I am referring here to Lebanese water — Israel attempted to annex part of southeast 
Lebanon to control the Wazzani; they continued to pump water out of it. 
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military arm, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). They wanted the 
PLO out; and they wanted to prevent the PLO from moving back in.64   
The Islamic regime of Iran was important to Hezbollah. They looked to 
Iran as a model for Lebanon and practiced extreme loyalty to Imam Khomeini of 
Iran. Hezbollah advocated an Islamic Republic with close ties to Shi’ite brethren 
in Iran. Like Iran, its goals went so far as eradicating all western influence and 
promoting an Islamic revolution in the world. 
The Ta’if Accords in 1989 ended the Lebanese Civil War with no clear 
victory for anybody. Heavily influenced by the Syrian government and the Arab 
League, the Lebanese Parliament adopted the Arab League’s political reform 
proposal that became the basis for the Ta’if Accords. Under this agreement, 
Christians and Muslims are provided equal representation in Parliament. 
Preserving the Lebanese confessional system of democracy, the Presidency 
remained a Christian position; the office of the Prime Minister remained a Sunni 
Muslim position; and the Speaker of Parliament a Shi’ite. The different Lebanese 
factions reluctantly accepted the Ta’if Accords; fighting ended and Lebanon’s 
reconstruction started. As for Hezbollah, it continued its struggle with Israel (and 
the United States) and vowed to continue until all Lebanese land is back in 
Lebanese hands.   
The position Hezbollah advocated during the war confirmed Hezbollah’s 
transformation from the traditionally quiescent and submissive Shi’ite of the past 
to the extremist and radical Hezbollah Shi’ite of the civil war. It showed a more 
politically dynamic Shi’ite, aware of the social conditions of his/her country and 
ready to act on this awareness. Fouad Ajami stated, the “political tradition of 
submission gave way to a messianic movement; Shia clerics who once 
summoned men to worship, who monitored ritual, were summoning men to 
arms.”65   
 
                                            
64 The Israelis eventually drove the PLO out. 
65 Ajami, p. 191. 
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E. FROM RADICALISM TO POLITICAL ISLAMISM 
Fifteen years after the end of the civil war, Hezbollah seems to have 
gradually made the transition from extremist ideology to more moderate political 
activism. The rhetoric may still be the same, with its leadership shouting “Death 
to America.” A closer look however reveals a Hezbollah heavily entrenched in the 
Lebanese political system and providing for the needs of its constituents rather 
than exporting its revolutionary ideals.   
Hezbollah is now deeply entrenched in the society. A study by JoeMarie 
Fecci, concluded in the late 1990’s, found that “in Lebanon Hezbollah is well 
known and respected for its extensive social welfare and development 
programs.”66  She maintains “Hezbollah-affiliated associations have a reputation 
for honesty that stands out in a place where many of its counterparts are 
believed to be corrupt and inefficient.”67 Hezbollah was able to penetrate into 
places where the government could not for various reasons; and provided 
services often in tandem with, or in cooperation with the government.   
Fecci traced Hezbollah’s organized “production” of services with the 
creation of Jihad al Binna in 1988, an association meant to prevent the exodus of 
Shi’ites from the Beirut suburbs when their homes were being bombarded as a 
result of the civil war. The association spread to other areas where social 
services were severely lacking. The Jihad al Binna and other Hezbollah 
associations provide education, health care, assistance to victims of conflicts, 
and economic development.   
Currently, Jihad al Binna has been focusing on the agrarian sector, an 
important one since 40 percent of Lebanese workers work in agriculture. It 
established two centers in the western Bekaa valley that provides classes for 
cutting production costs and efficient agriculture, techniques for beekeeping, as 
                                            
66 JoeMarie Fecci, “Letter from Lebanon: As Hezbollah Hastens Israeli Withdrawal It 
Integrates Itself into South Lebanon’s Economic Life,” The Washington Report on Middle East 
Affairs XVIII, Issue 8 (December 1999): 26.  
67 Ibid, 26. 
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well as laboratories and nurseries for soil testing and experimenting with other 
crops. It also extends credits for fertilizers, seeds, and other agricultural needs. 
Hezbollah also runs many schools, orphanages, and religious institutions; 
a lot of them funded by Iran. Its members also own and maintain banks, radio 
and television stations, as well as newspapers, in addition to providing law and 
order. In a sense it has developed an Islamic parallel sector for its “territories” 
within Lebanon; this sector may have become a viable alternative to the state, 
especially in fulfilling their constituents’ economic self-interests.   
Providing social services is not new to Hezbollah; it has just been more 
efficient in doing it than the state. It has however grown leaps and bounds in the 
political arena. That is not surprising considering political survival has been a 
paramount goal from the start. In the early 1990, a declassified secret message 
from the American Embassy in London to the US Department of State quoted an 
informant well connected in Iran and Hezbollah, whose name is still classified, to 
have said: “the main issue for the Hezbollah is not ransom money or even 
relatives and friends in Israeli or Kuwaiti prisons. It is the future of Hezbollah as a 
political movement in Lebanon.”68 
Hezbollah was convinced that after the release of hostages (1990), Syria 
would destroy Hezbollah and leave Amal as the sole representative of the largest 
sect in Lebanon, the Shi’ites.  This of course concerned Iran who had 
considerable investment in Hezbollah — funding its social services, schools, 
orphanages, and religious institutions, as well as militia training and support. To 
protect its political future, Hezbollah wanted a guarantee from Syria and the US 
that Hezbollah would remain a political force, and even demanded a cabinet 
position in government. It is not conclusive as to whether Syria and the US gave 
in to Hezbollah’s demands or provided specific guarantees. What has become 
obvious today though is that Hezbollah has become a political force in Lebanese 
politics.  
                                            
68 Declassified 231855ZMAR90 SECRET Message, US Embassy London to Secretary of 
State. 
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When the hostage situation in 1990 was eventually resolved, Hezbollah 
gained a foothold in the Lebanese political system via participation in 
parliamentary elections in 1992 and 1996. Hezbollah maintained between eight 
to twelve seats in Parliament (of the total 99) at all times.  
While Hezbollah’s success in national politics is very important, 
Hezbollah’s participation in local politics is even more relevant. It is at the local 
level where constituents are closest to their representatives. It is here that people 
chose their leaders. Hamzeh contends “the very nature of municipal work — 
provision of services to the community — is a fundamental tenet of faith, and 
such work emphasizes the successfully Islamisation of all aspects of society, a 
goal that the Islamists have emphasized since the late 1980s, instead of their 
commitment to the violent overthrow of their regimes.”69  
 Hezbollah has proven politically adept at the local level as well. Its active 
participation in the 1998 municipal election (held for the first time in 35 years), 
firmly entrenched it in the Lebanese political system. Its overwhelming victory in 




De Toledano, citing European Intelligence sources, reports Hezbollah 
maintains “5,000 trained terrorists in Lebanon and Syria alone, armed with some 
10,000 missiles, tanks, and antiaircraft artillery,” as well as “another 15,000 to 
20,000 members in the United States, Latin America, Europe and East Asia;” and 
an “operational budget of $500 million.”70 Its familiar rhetoric of “Death to 
America” implies these resources will be used for terrorist purposes. 
On the other hand, Lebanese government officials maintain Hezbollah is a 
legitimate political party and no longer a terrorist organization as the United 
States State Department claims. I asked the Lebanese Ambassador to the US, 
                                            
69 Hamzeh, p. 739. 
70 De Toledano, p. 56. 
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Mr. Farid Abboud during a guest lecture at UC Berkeley what is the official 
relationship between Hezbollah and the government and he answered 
“coordinating.” He and many others in Lebanon do not consider Hezbollah a 
terrorist organization.  Mr. Farid Abboud, a Christian, also emphatically defended 
the Shi’ite Hezbollah as a legitimate political party, engaged in political work and 
not terrorist activities.   
A closer study of Hezbollah’s ideology, however, shows a shift from 
political Islamism to more radical strains of Islamist activism in the 80’s and 90’s 
and then a gradual shift back to political Islamism in the late 90’s to today. 
Regardless of the radical rhetoric, Hezbollah’s political Islamism shows well in its 
social services organizations and most especially in its political participation. 
Hezbollah has evolved to a legitimate political party, an active, accepted 
participant in the Lebanese social and political system. An Islamic state may still 
be the end goal but the means to that is no longer defined by a Marxist, Shariati 
or Khomeini ideology of violent revolution; but rather an “Islamic revolution” in the 
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V. THE SYRIA ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEBANESE 
SOVEREIGNTY RESTORATION ACT OF 2003 
A. INTRODUCTION  
In this chapter, I will explore and analyze the second most relevant issue 
affecting US-Lebanese relations, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese 
Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003. This act was passed in the US House of 
Representatives with an overwhelming bipartisan majority, only four of the 435-
member House of Representatives cast a dissenting vote.  The US Senate vote 
was equally overwhelmingly bipartisan, with a final vote of 89 yeas to 4 nays. On 
December 12, 2003, the president’s signature made it Public Law No. 108-175. 
The Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act 
(SALSRA) was originally a bipartisan bill introduced on April 18, 2002 by 
Senators Barbara Boxer and Rick Santorum in the Senate (S. 2215), and 
Representatives Dick Armey and Elliot Engel  in the House of Representatives 
(H.R. 4483), as the "Syria Accountability Act." It was an updated version of H.R. 
2056, the “Lebanon Independence Restoration Act of 1999,” introduced in June 
1999 by Representative Michael P. Forbes.   
The SALSRA holds Syria accountable for causing serious international 
security problems in the Middle East, and demands Syria end its support for 
terrorists, end its acquisition and production of weapons of mass destruction and 
long-range ballistic missiles, prevent terrorists and weapons from entering Iraq, 
and pull Syrian troops out of Lebanon.  To force Syria to meet these demands, 
the US Congress requires the president to impose a number of diplomatic 
pressures and economic measures, including an export ban, a ban on sales of 
dual-use technology, prohibition of operations by US businesses, limits on Syrian 
airline flights within the US, reduction of diplomatic contacts, and freeze on 
Syrian assets in the US.   
In this chapter, I will explore the implications of the SALSRA to Lebanon 
and to US foreign policy toward Lebanon.  I will focus on the one US demand 
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most relevant to US-Lebanese relations, the pull out of Syrian military personnel 
from Lebanon.  I will also analyze the implications of the SALSRA for the Bush 
administration, a non-participant in its creation but given the task of implementing 
it, and its implications on other US national security interests.  
It is important to understand the implications of the SALSRA for they 
reveal opportunities for US policy makers to evaluate current positions in Middle 
East politics.  Evaluation of these positions is necessary and valuable in winning 
the global war on terrorism and pursuing the stated US national security strategy 
of propagating liberal democracy and free enterprise in the Middle East. 
 
B. THE SALSRA AND LEBANON  
The SALSRA called for adherence to UN Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 520 that stipulates "strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive 
authority of the Government of Lebanon through the Lebanese Army throughout 
Lebanon."71 UNSCR 520 was originally approved in 1982 and its language 
applied to Israel and Syria to completely withdraw from Lebanon, including all 
their military, paramilitary, and security forces.  Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 
May 2000, while the Syrian military remained.72  The US finds “Syria is in 
violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 520 (September 17, 
1982) through its continued occupation of Lebanese territory and its 
encroachment upon Lebanon's political independence.”73 
The US Congress demanded as a statement of policy that “the 
Government of Syria should immediately declare its commitment to completely 
withdraw its armed forces, including military, paramilitary, and security forces, 
                                            
71 UN Security Council Resolution 520, September 17, 1982. 
72 Israel has not withdrawn from the Shabaa Farms.  Whether the Shabaa Farms belongs to 
Lebanon or Syria is disputed by the UN, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. The UN Secretary General, 
however, has certified Israel’s pull out from Lebanon in accordance with UNSCR 425. 
73 The Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, December 
2003. 
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from Lebanon, and set a firm timetable for such withdrawal.”74  The new 
statement of policy puts the burden of action on Syria to abide by UN resolutions 
and the Ta’if Accords in order to help Lebanon regain its sovereignty and 
independence.  
Stephen Zunes argues Lebanese sovereignty was not in the US 
policymakers mind in the first place, because if they did, “they would have 
demanded that Israel abide by UN Security Council resolution 520 and nine other 
resolutions demanding Israeli withdrawal … prior to Israel’s long-overdue pullout 
in May 2000.”75  I agree that the US should have done more and should have 
engaged Lebanon in the past.  I argue, however, that the environment then – the 
frame of mind of US leaders – was still caught in a dependent path of ignoring 
Lebanon, a trajectory of policy which was brought about by the 1983 Beirut 
bombings.  As I argued in the previous chapters, the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 presented an opportunity for a different path of engagement 
that the US seems to be following now.   
The most visible sign of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon is the number of 
Syrian military personnel operating inside Lebanon. Abdelnour and Gambill 
estimated that from a troop strength numbering 35,000 to 40,000 Syrian soldiers 
in Lebanon in 2000, the number is now down to 16,000.76  It seems there was a 
conscious decision by Syrian President Bashar Assad, who ascended to power 
in July 2000, to honor Syria’s obligations under the Ta’if Accords to redeploy 
Syrian troops.  This decision took place before the passage of the SALSRA and 
was most likely a response to the growing overt Lebanese opposition to Syrian 
hegemony, as well as a reciprocal response to Israeli troop withdrawal from 
Lebanon in May 2000; and possibly as a response to pressure from the Bush 
administration.  In any case, the Syrian redeployment happened quietly, 
incrementally, and gradually. With the publicity that came along with the passage 
                                            
74 Ibid. 
75 Stephen Zunes, “The Syrian Accountability Act and the Triumph of Hegemony,” Foreign 
Policy in Focus (October 2003): 5. 
76 Ziad Abdelnour and Gary Gambill, “Syria’s Fourth Redeployment from Lebanon,” Middle 
East Intelligence Bulletin 5 No. 7 (July 2003). 
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of the SALSRA, it is now unlikely that the Syrian military would pull out 
completely since doing so may be construed as giving in to foreign pressure.   
While the SALSRA focuses on the Syrian military, the real strength of 
Syria’s hegemony may have remained hidden.  The Syrian military’s withdrawal 
from Lebanon arguably only has limited effect on Syria’s political hegemony over 
Lebanon.  Abdelnour and Gambill state that “Whatever the extent of future troops 
reductions by Syria, they are unlikely to directly impact its control of Lebanon, 
which depends more on Syria’s plainclothes secret police and political patronage 
networks than on the size of its occupation army.”77   
The act also calls for Lebanon (and Syria) to enter into serious bilateral 
negotiations with Israel for the sake of peace in the region.  This goal is mostly 
aimed at Syria and not Lebanon.  It tries to force Syria to let Lebanon act as an 
independent state that is able to conclude its own treaties.  But with Syria 
exercising political hegemony over Lebanon, it would not be realistic to think 
Lebanon could enter into any serious bilateral negotiations with Israel. It could 
certainly be overridden by Syria, similar to the May 17, 1983 Lebanon-Israel 
agreement.  The Lebanese government then was forced to abrogate that 
agreement that could have ended the Lebanese civil war while the Reagan 
administration stood by helpless. 
Another provision of the SALSRA pertains to the status of Hezbollah, a 
group listed in the US list of terrorist groups, and the deployment of Lebanese 
forces in south Lebanon.  The SALSRA states that   
It is the sense of Congress that the Government of Lebanon should 
deploy the Lebanese armed forces to all areas of Lebanon, 
including South Lebanon, in accordance with United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 520 (September 17, 1982), in order to 
assert the sovereignty of the Lebanese state over all of its territory, 
and should evict all terrorist and foreign forces from southern 
Lebanon, including Hizballah and the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards.78 
                                            
77 Ibid. 
78 The Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, December 
2003. 
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While the sense of Congress is in accordance with a UN resolution, it is 
somewhat awkward to see such wording in another state’s public law for the 
following reasons.  First, the act calls for Lebanese sovereignty and yet it turns 
around and “suggests” (as evidenced by the use of the word “should”) how the 
Lebanese government could perform internal state actions, national defense and 
protecting its borders.  The suggestion appears to be an intrusion in another 
state’s sovereignty. Secondly, it again ignores the reality of the Lebanese 
situation, particularly, Syrian political hegemony.   
Not surprisingly, the implementation of the SALSRA is not well received in 
the Syrian-backed Lebanese government.  In March 2004 during a visit to the 
region, US Secretary of State Colin Powell called on Syria to fully withdraw its 
troops from Lebanon and encouraged Lebanon to extend its army to the south 
and provide security there. The response from Lebanese President Emile 
Lahoud was not encouraging.  Lahoud stated that “the Syrian presence in 
Lebanon is an internal and regional stabilizing factor” and stressed that “Syria 
helped Lebanon safeguard its unity, rebuild its national army and facilitated the 
liberation of most of the South of the country occupied by Israel.”79 
As far as the presence of Hezbollah and the absence of the Lebanese 
army in south Lebanon, the US lawmakers and the governments of Syria and 
Lebanon do not see eye to eye on this issue.  As we explored in the previous 
chapter, Hezbollah has transformed and has become fully entrenched in the 
political process.  Much more, Hezbollah has become popular with the Lebanese 
people that actions against it would likely risk instability again in the Levant. 
Finally, the SALSRA also limited the provision of “humanitarian and 
educational assistance to the people of Lebanon only through appropriate 
private, nongovernmental organizations and appropriate international 
organizations, until such time as the Government of Lebanon asserts sovereignty 
and control over all of its territory and borders and achieves full political 
                                            
79 The Daily Star Online Editor, “Powell to Syria: Leave Lebanon, Urges Withdrawal of 
troops,” The Daily Star, March 22, 2004. 
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independence.”80 This part of SALSRA serves as motivation for the Lebanese 
government to reject Syrian political hegemony. However, it also seems to doubt 
the Lebanese government’s ability to conduct state business.  
There is also the risk that US assistance falls to the wrong hands.  The 
criteria for determining an appropriate nongovernmental organization are not 
clear.  Amy Hawthorne, in her study of the Clinton administration’s democracy 
promotion efforts, finds that ‘the U.S. sometimes focused on institutions that 
many Arabs themselves considered ineffective, such as ossified political parties 
or “‘non-governmental” organizations whose leaders had been co-opted by 
government officials.’ 81 
 
C. IMPLICATIONS TO US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES 
 
Finally, the United States will use this moment of opportunity to 
extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively 
work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, 
and free trade to every corner of the world.82 
-- President George W. Bush 
 
The overwhelming support in the legislative branch suggests the American 
public, through its representatives in Congress, is on board with the Bush 
administration’s neoconservative foreign policy vision – a world full of 
independent, sovereign, democratic states are more likely to bring peace and 
stability.  The passage of the SALSRA suggests American unity, at least in its 
policy toward Syria and Lebanon, in following US national security strategies of 
promoting liberal democracy and free enterprise. The democratization of 
Lebanon is also in line with that vision.   
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(February 2001): 47. 
82 The quote is from the introduction to the US National Security Strategy, September 17, 
2002. 
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Stephen Zunes does not see it as building democracy but a US 
unilateralist tendency.  He argues that SALSRA confirms the full acceptance 
within the US legislative branch of the Bush administration’s unilateralist 
worldview. He also provides an answer to why it was passed with overwhelming 
bipartisan majority.  He stated:  
The answer may lie in today’s unipolar world system where the 
United States, rather than supporting comprehensive and law-
based means of promoting regional peace and security, insists 
upon the right to impose unilateral demands targeted at specific 
countries based largely upon ideological criteria.  As the one-
sidedness of the vote on this resolution indicates, both the 
Republicans and the Democrats—including the most liberal wing of 
the party—now accept this vision of U.S. foreign policy.83 
Zunes’ argument is an interesting one since the Bush administration 
reluctantly signed on to this legislation.  The BBC news reported that “President 
Bush has sought to distance himself from the law, hinting he might waive some 
of its measures in the interests of national security.”84  In a statement during the 
signing of the act into law, the president was quoted as saying "My approval of 
the act does not constitute my adoption of the various statements of policy in the 
act as US foreign policy."85   
Judging by the president’s comments, it seems the Bush administration is 
seeking to lower expectations of a successful outcome from the SALSRA while 
also affirming that US foreign policy making is an executive branch responsibility, 
and not a legislative one. The SALSRA is a legislative branch initiative while 
foreign policy implementation is in the executive’s purview.  
It is not that the Bush administration opposes the act; it is the lawmakers’ 
misunderstanding of Middle East politics and the intrusion in the conduct of 
foreign policy that is the cause of concern.  The act imposes actions on Syria and 
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84 The statement was reported in the BBC news, December 13, 2003. 
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Lebanon that may not be realistic.  It also imposes actions on the executive 
branch that may undermine overall US foreign policy efforts in the Middle East. 
The Bush administration’s reluctance to aggressively champion the full 
implementation of the SALSRA is not without reason. Forcing its implementation 
has serious implications to the global war on terrorism and greatly affects the 
dynamics of the national security strategy of propagating liberal democracy and 
free enterprise.  
Claude Salhani argues the SALSRA “leads in the wrong direction in the 
fight against anti-American terrorists by escalating an unnecessary conflict in the 
Middle East that will only strengthen those who wish us harm.”86  He argues that 
“although the Syria Accountability Act provides the United States with a new 
collection of sticks with which to beat Damascus, there are precious few carrots 
to encourage continued cooperation by Syria in the fight against Al Qaeda.”87  
The new collection of sticks, the consequences for failing to act, is far from 
overwhelming.  Rania Abouzeid states the economic sanctions will not have the 
intended effect since trade between the US and Syria is relatively low at $300 
million a year and Syria will simply find other trading partners, particularly 
Europe.88 Abouzeid reports Syria has been negotiating a partnership accord with 
the European Union that could potentially lead to the creation of a free-trade 
zone by 2010.89    
The threats of diplomatic pressure are also toothless. The US has been 
maintaining a diplomatic presence in Syria despite Syria’s status as a state that 
sponsors terrorism.  There is no evidence the Bush administration will drastically 
alter US diplomatic presence. Syria continues to be an important regional player 
in other US national security interests, specifically the Middle East peace plan 
                                            
86 Claude Salhani, “The Syria Accountability Act: Taking the Wrong Road to Damascus,” 
Policy Analysis 512 (March 2004). 
87 Ibid. 
88 Rania Abouzeid, “US Policy toward Syria Misguided,” aljazeera.net (November 4, 2003). 
(http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/OC7DCF19-F9EE-44D8-8AA1-8AEC7844512F.htm)  
89 Ibid.   
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and preserving stability in the region, maintaining Israel’s security, and ensuring 
reliable access to inexpensive petroleum supply from the region.  Confrontation 
with Syria will directly undermine those national security interests. 
The Bush administration is placed in the unenviable position of balancing 
and prioritizing national security interests in the Middle East.  Previous 
administrations chose to subsume US interests in Lebanon’s independence, 
democracy, and sovereignty to an overall regional policy. While it is too early to 
tell if the Bush administration will soon follow, early indications suggest the Bush 
administration is traveling a different path in its policy toward Lebanon.  
With the show of American unity, the SALSRA may have given the Bush 
administration the green light to fully follow a new path of engagement in 
Lebanon. However, it also necessitated an evaluation of US foreign policy toward 
Lebanon to ensure the SALSRA does not undermine the administration’s efforts 
in the global war on terrorism, Middle East peace plan, and other national 
security interests.  The administration must evaluate its foreign policy and 
determine a way where the SALSRA can be used to better serve US interests.  
 
D. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SALSRA AND LEBANON 
While at first glance, the goals and demands of the SALSRA on Lebanon 
seem to be reasonable, a careful analysis of the act shows there is not much 
Lebanon could do and shows the goals of this act may be unattainable at this 
time.  The realities of Middle East politics, particularly Syria’s hegemony over 
Lebanon, preclude the Lebanese government from acting, even if it wants to.  In 
the process, Lebanon is again caught in the middle, between Syria with 
thousands of troops inside its territories, and the US whose intentions may be 
good but may not be able to back it up with real action. The US has followed a 
cut and run policy in the past. 
On the brighter side, there are two issues brought about by the passage of 
the SALSRA that reveal an emerging new path in US-Lebanese relationship and 
greatly affect US foreign policy toward Lebanon.  The first is the willingness to 
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engage in Lebanon’s transition to a sovereign democratic state once more; and 
the second, the willingness to divorce US policy toward Lebanon with the broader 
and more comprehensive Middle East peace plan. Under the SALSRA, it 
became “the policy of the United States that the full restoration of Lebanon's 
sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity is in the national 
security interest of the United States,” and that “Syria's obligation to withdraw 
from Lebanon is not conditioned upon progress in the Israeli-Syrian or Israeli-
Lebanese peace process but derives from Syria's obligation under Security 
Council Resolution 520.”90  
With the passage of SALSRA into US public law, both the executive and 
the legislative branches of the US government are now committed to Lebanon’s 
independence, sovereignty, and transition to democracy. American solidarity on 
this issue is now fully affirmed, giving the Bush administration leverage in 
diplomatic negotiations with the international community.  The US, for example, 
was able to collaborate with France to propose and ensure the passage of 
UNSCR 1559. In this resolution, the Security Council “declared its support for a 
free and fair presidential election in Lebanon conducted according to Lebanese 
constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence and, in that 
connection, called upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from 
Lebanon.”91 The language and the intent of UNSCR 1559 are very similar to the 
SALSRA.    
The second positive issue from the SALSRA that affects foreign policy 
making toward Lebanon is the call for treating Lebanon’s sovereignty and 
independence as a separate US national interest.  This is relevant in that it 
breaks away from previous US administrations’ practice of lumping together 
national interests and promulgating one overarching regional strategy. It 
suggests that the US has once again found Lebanon strategically important to 
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91 UNSCR 1559, September 2, 2004.  Despite the resolution, the Cabinet of Prime Minister 
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US national interests.  It took over 20 years (since the 1983 Beirut bombings) 
and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, for the US to find a new path of 
engagement in its foreign policy toward Lebanon.  This time, a cut and run policy 
is unlikely to return.     
Previous actions by the Bush administration in Afghanistan and Iraq 
indicate that this administration will likely follow through with actions when it 
commits itself to a certain cause.  The administration seems to be serious about 
its new strategy and has linked the global war on terrorism with freedom and 
spreading democracy.  In his November 6 speech, the president said, “Sixty 
years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in 
the Middle East did nothing to make us safe, because in the long run stability 
cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty.”92  
Treating Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty as a separate US 
national security issue says the US is serious about its new strategy; it is 
committed to democracy in the Middle East; and Lebanon is a place to start.  It 
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A. PATH DEPENDENCE THEORY 
Certain events matter.  In the case of US foreign policy toward Lebanon, 
there are two particular events, or critical junctures, which matter most to both 
policymakers and students of policy making.  The first happened in Beirut over 
twenty years ago and influenced US policymaking during the last two decades.  It 
started a path dependent policy of largely ignoring the historical and strategic 
importance of Lebanon. The second happened over 9,000 kilometers from 
Beirut; it happened in the US and is poised to reverse the course paved by the 
first, providing an opportunity for the US to re-evaluate its relationship with a tiny 
but significant state in the Levant, Lebanon.    
The first series of events occurred in Beirut – the 1983 bombings.  These 
resulted in a “cut and run policy” that began a trajectory of policies favoring 
disengagement with Lebanon. Disengagement was an erroneous policy, I argue, 
because Lebanon was of strategic importance to US national security, an 
importance which remained after the bombings.  Further, this policy of 
disengagement overlooked the democratic legacy of the country. Arguably, the 
path taken by the US contributed to the Lebanese state’s continued demise in 
the 1980’s, prolonged civil war, Syria’s political hegemony, and the flourishing of 
violent groups such as Hezbollah.  It could also have affected the success of 
anti-terrorism policies worldwide.   
The second series of events occurred on September 11, 2001 – the 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  The policies 
resulting from this act brought the US back to a policy of active engagement in 
the Middle East, taking the global war on terrorism away from US soil.  It also 
resulted in the acceptance of a grand strategy of spreading liberal democracy 
and advocating free enterprise worldwide.  More importantly for US-Lebanese 
relations, it gave the US an opportunity to change paths in its foreign policy and 
re-examine its relationship with the Levantine nation.   
72 
Whether the Bush administration will take the opportunity to fully change 
path is yet to be determined. Early indications are positive. How the Bush 
administration and future administrations proceed in the next few months 
regarding the two most controversial issues explored in this paper — Hezbollah 
and the implementation of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty 
Restoration Act of 2003 (SALSRA) could determine the fate of US-Lebanese 
relations.  Policies enacted during this period could also affect whether Lebanon 
will once again attain the distinction of being the only democratic Arab state in 
the Middle East.   
Path dependence theory matters. It has been a significant factor behind 
the US policy of disengagement toward Lebanon since 1983.  Instead of the 
vicious cycle of disengagement wrought by the 1980s policy, a new path 
dependence of engaged political activism could bring a more positive future for 
Lebanon. Foreign policy makers and students of policymaking need to 
understand path dependence theory in order to be aware of events that could 
trigger dependent paths, recognizing them as critical junctures, and so 
consciously factor the effects of path dependence into their decision making.  
Otherwise, alternatives outside the path dependent trajectory would not be 
considered. US policy toward Lebanon is a case in point. The US failed to 
recognize the dependent path it was traveling in which negatively affected its 
policies toward Lebanon for the past two decades.  
 
B. WHERE DOES THE US GO FROM HERE? 
The US needs to recognize this opportunity to break away from its current 
policy path, reassess its treatment of Lebanon, and determine a new path that 
will effectively serve US strategic goals. Such a new policy would be consistent 
with the US national security strategy of spreading liberal democracy and free 
market worldwide, goals arguably more easily obtained in Lebanon than in other 
Middle Eastern countries with substantial US involvement.  
Recent actions to the Bush administration in the United Nations, and the 
administration’s cautious approach to the implementation of the SALSRA 
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suggest the US is hesitantly beginning to recognize the historical and strategic 
importance of Lebanon, particularly its democratic potential. The US’ verbal 
commitment and support for Lebanese sovereignty and independence appear to 
be accompanied with direct diplomacy towards Syria and Lebanon, along with 
the broader international community. While Iraq’s democratic potential still tops 
the US list of priorities, Lebanon is starting to climb up the list of the US’ most 
important foreign policy issues. The recent passage of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1559 attests to Lebanon’s importance. 
Perhaps the US has begun to recognize that Lebanon is well-placed 
among the Arab states to succeed in a transition to democracy. The 
infrastructure and the institutions for democracy are still present in Lebanon. 
Finally, the US may be starting to believe that a return to democracy in Lebanon 
is in the US best interests.  A democratic Lebanon would not only lessen its 
appeal as a haven for terrorism, but would also provide the US with a democratic 
Arab ally in the Middle East. 
 
C. LEBANON’S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
How can the US facilitate Lebanon’s transition to democracy? There are 
many suggestions.  Actively pursuing a solution to the overall Middle East peace 
process, advocating bilateral peace between Israel and Lebanon, promoting 
economic progress, leaving Lebanon alone, aggressively pursuing the objectives 
of SALSRA, and developing a democratic peace strategy for the Middle East are 
just some of them. 
The Lebanese ambassador to the US, His Excellency Farid Abboud, in 
reference to the Middle East peace process and its effects on Lebanon 
suggested that   
The United States will have to play an active and evenhanded role 
in the process. It is vital that the United States acts decisively as far 
as the negotiations are concerned. The Madrid Conference 
stipulated that the United States is "a sponsor, a fair mediator, and 
a driving force of the entire process." This is what the U.S. role 
should be again, a driving force in the peace process. A laid-back 
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approach will not be productive and will not be congruent with the 
Madrid terms of reference. In view of our friendship with the U.S., 
we look forward to such an active role and to such a supportive 
role.93 
Terry Anderson, speaking about the Syrian occupation and possible US 
response, stated: “one of the most constructive things that America could do in 
its policy toward Lebanon, is to recognize and respect that there is a Lebanese 
Government, which was elected by the people of Lebanon, in a flawed but mostly 
democratic process, and that it will be up to that government to decide when to 
demand the Syrians leave.”94 The US could then help in rebuilding the country 
and strengthening its democratic institutions. 
Former president Amin Gemayel suggested the need for a strong 
diplomatic American initiative – “initiatives with muscles” since the US has 
leverage in its relationship with both Syria and Israel.95  Gemayel’s suggestions 
included strong US support in upholding the 1989 Ta’if Agreements, enforcement 
of UN Resolutions 425, 426, and 520, Syrian withdrawal from all of Lebanon, and 
supporting free elections held under international supervision. 
Amy Hawthorne also has suggestions to achieve a more effective strategy 
of promoting Arab democracy.  One of these was that “the U.S. should not try to 
address too many issues in too superficial a manner.  It should carefully and 
thoughtfully determine its top democracy-related priorities and push these issues 
consistently at a political level.”96 
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Abboud, Anderson, Gemayel and Hawthorne all have excellent 
suggestions and each deserves US policymakers’ careful consideration. Mark 
Amstutz, however, provides the most appropriate advice.  
Intended as universal guidance for developing a more prudent and 
effective human rights policy, Amstutz developed four principles:  “(1) the priority 
of actions over declarations, (2) the necessity of developing preconditions for 
sustaining and protecting basic rights, (3) the superiority of quiet over public 
diplomacy, and (4) the imperative of humility and modesty.”97  Substituting 
“democracy” for “sustaining and protecting basic rights” in the second principle, 
all four principles become applicable to conducting US foreign policy toward 
Lebanon.  
The first principle recognizes the priority of actions over declarations.  
Actions speak louder than words. Distancing itself from the SALSRA and 
reserving the right to use the SALSRA only when it furthers national security 
interests show the Bush administration is already ahead in applying this principle. 
The administration recognized most of the SALSRA’s goals cannot be 
immediately translated into action.  Further, the Bush administration has already 
established an international reputation of doing what it says it was going to do. 
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are testimonies to that.   
The US could use that reputation for action in fostering better relationships 
within the Arab world. Relationships are built on trust and trust is built when one 
knows where the other stands. The US could also reverse present trends and try 
to present itself as an honest broker of peace in the Middle East.  To be honest 
brokers, US policymakers must have a good grounding on the international laws 
of right and wrong and must be able to always stand on the right, regardless of 
the country it is standing against. The US must also show that when a wrong is 
committed, it does not hesitate to intervene on the side of right, provided the right 
could be determined. 
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The second principle affirms the necessity of developing preconditions for 
democracy. To do this, US policymakers must rid themselves of many 
preconceptions they have regarding the Middle East, and make an effort to 
understand what could work in the region.  There are many who blindly follow 
Orientalist approaches which erroneously question Arab character and political 
culture, and misunderstand Islam, tribalism, and patrimonial societies.  Such 
preconceptions and stereotypes hinder and misdirect US efforts to cultivate the 
essential social, civic, political, and economic preconditions for democracy. 
The preconditions for democracy include a society which understands 
democracy and is willing to fight for it, an economy that is not totally dependent 
on the ruling regime, a civil society which cannot be easily coerced by an 
authoritarian regime and a government where the legislature could exert real 
power over the executive.  To aid in the development of these elements, the US 
should expand its economic, humanitarian and democracy building programs in 
Lebanon.   
The presidential initiative Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is a 
broad step in the right direction for US policy in Lebanon.  It affirms US 
commitment to Middle East reform by supporting and funding economic, political, 
and educational reform efforts.  With over $129 million committed to this effort in 
2003 (in addition to bilateral economic assistance), Lebanon is well poised to 
benefit.  Other US support to Lebanon is from the US Agency for International 
Development.  This agency is focused on expanding economic opportunities and 
investment, accelerating economic reforms, encouraging trade and foreign 
investment, improving municipal services and environmental practices and 
policies, enhancing rural development, and developing public-private 
partnerships.   
United States support to Lebanon’s economic recovery and reconstruction 
is commendable but not sufficient.  More can be done to support and increase 
funding for institutions of higher learning, other credible private institutions and 
non-governmental organizations such as the American University in Beirut and 
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Radio Free Lebanon which can promote liberal democracy and free enterprise.  
Funding, however, must be controlled to ensure it gets to the right people.  More 
can also be done to locate business incentives and create economic 
opportunities. 
The third principle suggests that the US proceed cautiously in its 
diplomacy, pointing toward quiet, not public, diplomacy. The elder Bush’s 
administration accomplished more in the Middle East peace process through 
behind the scene negotiations for peace.  The younger Bush administration 
should follow the same principle in its relations with Lebanon.  It should 
encourage, for example, quiet diplomatic efforts to obtain bilateral agreements, 
even just a genuine truce, between Israel and Lebanon, exclusive of any 
agreements related to the peace process.   
One pitfall the US should avoid is linking relations with Lebanon to a 
broader or comprehensive peace program.  The interests of Lebanon cannot be 
achieved if they are always linked with the interests of Syria or other 
comprehensive plan.  The US should develop an independent policy toward an 
independent Lebanon that could work regardless of the failure of a 
comprehensive plan for the region.   
The last principle is integrally connected to the third and suggests how the 
US should proceed in the conduct of foreign policy – with humility and modesty.  
The US often conducts its foreign policy toward any nation with the best 
intentions.  However, the way the US proceeds in arguing its case often ignores 
the cultural sensitivities of other nations.  In the process, US foreign policies are 
often perceived as arrogant in the Middle East.   
 
D. IRAQ, LEBANON, AND THE US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
US national security strategy centers on establishing regimes friendly to 
the West, arguably through liberal democracy and free enterprise in the Middle 
East.  The US road map to peace in the Middle East banks on success in 
democracy-building in Iraq spilling over into other states in the region.  Eventually 
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it is hoped that the tide of peace would settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  In 
this strategy, Lebanese independence and transition to democracy would be a 
by-product of Iraqi democracy.   
Currently, Iraq is in the center of the Bush administration’s national 
security strategy; it should be Lebanon.  Success in Iraq is proving to be elusive 
and I submit that democratizing Lebanon would be a more expedient and realistic 
way to show that an Arab nation could be democratic and economically 
prosperous.  Lebanon has a democratic legacy and has the institutions 
necessary for democratization.  Much more, its historical ties to the West make 
success more probable than Iraq.   
Indications of economic progress, with some political progress, make 
democracy even more appealing and more probable in Lebanon.  Lebanon’s 
economic reforms are already showing limited but positive effects on the financial 
market.  CNN.com reported that about $4 billion in low cost loans from the 
international community, as well as plans to raise $5 billion are raising Lebanon’s 
hope for continued economic recovery.98  A projected $5 billion is to be raised 
through partial privatization of the government’s power monopoly, sale of mobile 
phone licenses, and payroll cuts in state-run companies to facilitate privatization.    
Other reports are equally promising.  The 2003 US Report on the Middle 
East-Lebanon suggests confidence in the Lebanese government’s economic 
strategy, despite its $34 billion foreign debt (which constitutes 178 percent of its 
gross national product).99  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated a 
two percent growth in Lebanon’s gross domestic product in 2002, insufficient 
considering population growth but still promising considering it is a positive 
number. Inflation is at around 1.75 percent, down significantly from a high of 131 
percent in 1992 and 15 percent in 1995.100  An IMF official declared: "Over the 
last 10 years, Lebanon has made remarkable strides to rebuild itself into an 
open, service-oriented economy. It has successfully re-established itself as a                                             
98 Data from CNN.com news article, “Loans Buy Time for Lebanon,” November 25, 2002. 
99 U.S. Report on the Middle East – Lebanon. 2003. (http://www.usrom.com) 
100 Ibid. 
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major banking center, tourist destination, and as a provider of higher education 
and health services for the region."101 
There is also progress in the political arena. Elections, though criticized as 
fraudulent, have been held where even Hezbollah participated and won seats. 
This shows that the various parties of Lebanese politics are willing to participate 
in a democratic process.  Syria’s hegemony over political leaders remains strong 
however, casting a shadow on the future of possible political reforms.   
Nevertheless, studies show Lebanon has the greatest potential for further 
democratic development among the Arab countries in the Middle East. Baaklini, 
Denoeux, and Springborg found that the presence of established institutions for 
effective legislature, the strength of a state’s parliament, could make transition to 
democracy less difficult.102 Taking Syrian hegemony out of the equation and 
focusing solely on the relationship between the legislative branch and the 
executive branch, Lebanon’s legislature is strong and can play an active role in 
the democratization process.  It has an established constitution, is autonomous, 
and is capable of resisting the executive branch if necessary.  Further, it has the 
resources to effectively influence state decision-making.    
It would behoove US policymakers to consider the possibility of making 
Lebanon the lynchpin to Middle East peace.  Lebanon certainly has the potential 
to become a model for democracy, much more than Iraq does.  Lebanon has the 
experience and desire to move forward and prosper economically and politically 
once again.  If the US succeeds in helping Lebanon become a model for 
democracy and free trade, the rest of the region may follow.  
The US supported Lebanon wholeheartedly before the 1983 Beirut 
bombings because of its strategic importance.  Lebanon continues to be vital to 
US national interests and the advancement of national security objectives.  The 
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Bush administration should fully commit to a path of engagement and support for 




LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abboud, Farid. “Lebanon and the Peace Process: An Update.” Speech before 
the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, June 28, 1999. 
 
Abdelnour, Ziad and Gary Gambill. “Syria’s Fourth Redeployment from Lebanon.” 
Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 5 No. 7 (July 2003). 
 
Abouzeid, Rania. “US Policy toward Syria Misguided.” Aljazeera.net, November 
4, 2003. (http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/OC7DCF19-F9EE-44D8-8AA1- 
8AEC7844512F.htm). 
 
Ajami, Fouad. The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986. 
 
Akarli, Engin. The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1993. 
 
Amstutz, Mark R. International Ethics: Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global 
Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999. 
 
Anderson, Lisa. “Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political Culture 
Approach.” In Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, 
volume 1: Theoretical Perspectives, edited by Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and 
Paul Noble. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995. 
 
Art, Robert. “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique.” 
Policy Sciences 4, (1973). 
 
Baaklini, Abdo, Guilain Denoeux, and Robert Springborg. Legislative Politics in 
the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1999.  
 
Bellin, Eva. “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East:  
Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Politics, (January 
2004). 
 
Brumberg, Daniel. “Authoritarian Legacies and Reform Strategies in the Arab 
World.” In Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, volume 
1: Theoretical Perspectives, edited by Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul 
Noble. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995. 
 
Bush, George W. Remarks at the 20th anniversary of the National Endowment 
for Democracy, Federal News Service, November 6, 2003. 
 
82 
Chatah, Mohamed. Remarks at National Association of Arab Americans Forum. 
Federal News Service, August 8, 1997. 
 
Cobban, Helena. The Making of Modern Lebanon. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1985. 
 
Dagher, Carole H.  Bring Down the Walls: Lebanon’s Post-War Challenge. New 
York, NY: Palgrave, 2000. 
 
David, Paul A. “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.” American Economic 
Review.  (May 1985): 332-337. 
 
De Toledano, Ralph. “Hezbollah Emerging as the Terrorist A-Team.” Insight on 
the News, March 16, 2004. 
 
Djerejian, Edward. Remarks at the National Association of Arab Americans 20th 
Anniversary conference. Federal News Service, September 11, 1992. 
 
Dodd, Scott and Peter Smolowitz. “1983 Beirut bombing began new era of 
Terror.” Charlotte Observer, Oct 21, 2003. 
 
Esposito, John.  The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality.  New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1999. 
 
Fearon, James D. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of 
International Disputes.” American Political Science Review 88 No. 3 (1994): 577-
592. 
 
Fecci, JoMarie.  “Letter from Lebanon: As Hezbollah Hastens Israeli Withdrawal 
It Integrates Itself into South Lebanon’s Economic Life.” The Washington Report 
on Middle East Affairs XVIII, Issue 8 (December 1999). 
 
Films for the Humanities and Sciences.  Islamic Conversations: Islam and War. 
30 min. 1994. Videocassette.  
 
Fisk, Robert.  Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon.  New York, NY: 
MacMillan Publishing Company, 1990. 
 
Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and 
the Creation of the Modern Middle East. New York, NY: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1989. 
 
Gates, Carolyn L. The Merchant Republic of Lebanon: Rise of an Open 




George, Alexander L. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The 
Effective Use of Information and Advice.  Boulder, CO:  Westview Press, 1980. 
 
Gerner, Deborah J., and Jillian Schwedler, eds. Understanding the 
Contemporary Middle East 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004. 
 
Hamzeh, A. Nizar. “Islamism in Lebanon: A Guide.” Middle East Review of 
International Affairs (September 1997). 
 
Hamzeh, A Nizar. “Lebanon’s Islamists and local politics: a New Reality.” Third 
World Quarterly 21 No. 5 (2000): 739-759. 
 
Hawthorne, Amy. “Do We Want Democracy in the Middle East?” Foreign Service 
Journal  (February 2001): 43-49. 
 
Hedlund, Stefan. “Path Dependence in Russian Policy Making: Constraints on 
Putin’s Economic Choice.” Post-Communist Economies 12, No. 4 (2000). 
 
Herb, Michael. All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the 
Middle Eastern Monarchies. Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1999. 
 
House, Karen Elliott. “Reagan’s World,” Wall Street Journal, June 3, 1980. 
 
Jervis, Robert. “Hypotheses on Misperception.” World Politics 20 No. 3 (1968). 
 
Kepel, Gilles.  Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam.  Translated by Anthony Roberts. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
 
Kissinger, Henry. Speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
October 1975. 
 
Lewis, Bernard. “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” The Atlantic Monthly 266, No. 3 
(September 1990): 47 - 60. 
 
Liebowitz, Stan and Stephen E. Margolis. “Policy and Path Dependence: From 
QWERTY to Windows 95.” Regulation 18 No. 3. (1995). 
 
Mahoney, James. The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political 
Regimes in Central America. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2002.  
 
McDowall, David.  Lebanon: A Conflict of Minorities.  Manchester, UK: 
Manchester Free Press, 1986, 1996.   
 
Neustadt, Richard E. and Ernest R. May. Thinking in Time: The Uses of History 
for Decision Makers. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1986. 
84 
 
Norton, Augustus R. “Lebanon’s Malaise.” Survival 42 No. 4 (Winter 2000): 35-
50. 
 
Owen, Roger. “Arab Nationalism, Unity and Solidarity.” In Sociology of 
“Developing Societies;” The Middle East, edited by Talal Asad and Roger Owen. 
New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1983. 
 
Perthes, Volker. The Political Economy of Syria under Asad. New York, NY: 
I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1995.   
 
Petran, Tabitha.  The Struggle Over Lebanon.  New York, NY: Monthly Review 
Press, 1987.   
 
Picard, Elizabeth.  Lebanon: A Shattered Country: Myths & Realities of the Wars 
in Lebanon. Translated by Franklin Philip. New York, NY: Holmes and Meier, 
2002.   
 
Posusney, Marsha Pripstein. “Behind the Ballot Box: Electoral Engineering in the 
Arab World.” Middle East Report 209 (Winter 1998). 
 
Powell, Colin L. Remarks at U.S.-Arab Economic Forum. September 29, 2003. 
 
Quandt, William B.  Peace process: American diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict since 1967. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993. 
 
Rippin, Andrew.  Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices. London, UK: 
Routledge, 2001. 
 
Rizvi, Seyyid Saeed Akhtar.  “The Illustrious Period of the Imamate of Imam Zayn 
al-‘Abidin.”  Al-Serat 5 Nos. 3 & 4 (1979).  
 
Ross, Michael L. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53 (2001). 
 
Sadowski, Yahya. “The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate.” In Political 
Islam: Essays from Middle East Report, edited by Joel Beinin and Joe Stork.  
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997. 
 
Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1979. 
 
Said, Edward W. Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine 
How We See the Rest of the World. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1997. 
 
Salhani, Claude.  “The Syria Accountability Act: Taking the Wrong Road to 
Damascus.” Policy Analysis 512 (2004). 
 
85 
Sayigh, Rosemary. "Palestinians in Lebanon: Uncertain Future." In Peace for 
Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction, edited by Deirdre Collings. Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994.  
 
Schiff, Ze’ev and Ehud Ya’ari. Israel’s Lebanon War. New York, NY: Simon and 
Schuster, 1984. 
 
Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act. Statutes at 
Large (2003). 
 
The Ta’if Accords.  October 22, 1989. http://www.mideastweb.org/taif.htm  
(September 2004). 
 
The White House.  The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America.  [Washington, D.C.]: The White House, September 2002. 
 
The White House. “Strategy for Lebanon,” National Security Decision Directive 
103, September 10, 1983. 
 
The White House. “Responding to the Lebanon Crisis,” National Security 
Decision Directive 109, October 23, 1983. 
 
The White House. “Next Steps toward Progress in Lebanon and the Middle 
East,” National Security Decision Directive 111, October 28, 1983. 
 
The White House. “Lebanon,” National Security Decision Directive 117, 
December 5, 1983. 
 
The White House. “Steps in Lebanon,” National Security Decision Directive 123, 
February 1, 1984. 
 
The White House. “Lebanon,” National Security Decision Directive 128, February 
26, 1984. 
 
The White House. “President’s Anti-terrorism Legislation,” National Security 
Decision Directive 138, April 26, 1984. 
 
The White House. “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State 
Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Office of the Spokesman, April 30, 
2003. 
 
The White House. “President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East,” 
Office of the Press Secretary, November 6, 2003. 
 
The White House. White House Press Conference, Office of the Press Secretary, 
January 29, 1981. 
86 
 
The Beirut Review. "Statement of Presidential Candidate Bill Clinton on Lebanon 
(Excerpts)," The Beirut Review 4 (Fall 1992). 
 
United Nations. UN Security Council Resolution 425, 19 March 1978. 
 
United Nations. UN Security Council Resolution 520, 17 September 1982. 
 
United Nations. UN Security Council Resolution 1559, 2 September 2004. 
 
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations. 
US Policy toward Lebanon. 105th Cong., 1st sess., 25 June 1997. 
 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Nomination of US 
Ambassador to Lebanon. 19 July 1995. 
 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs. The Future of Lebanon. 14 June 2000. 
 
U.S. Department of State. Information Sheet on Lebanon. [Washington, D.C.]: 
July 2003. 
 
U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003. [Washington, 
D.C.]: April 2004. 
 
U.S. Department of State. Press Briefing, Beirut, Lebanon. May 3, 2003.   
 
Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political 
Change in Egypt. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002. 
 
Wright, Robin. Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam. Carmichael, CA: 
Touchstone Books, 2001. 
 
Zunes, Stephen. “The Syrian Accountability Act and the Triumph of Hegemony,” 
Foreign Policy in Focus (October 2003). 
 
87 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
